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Freedom Not to Listen:
A Constitutional Analysis of
Compulsory Indoctrination Through
Workplace Captive Audience Meetings
Roger C. Hartleyt
Workplace captive audience meetings are assemblies of employees dur-
ing paid work time in which employers compel employees to listen to anti-
union and other types of proselytizing. Employers enforce attendance at
workplace captive audience meetings by threats of discharge. Typically, em-
ployers deny employees the right to ask questions or express disagreement
with the anti-union views presented during these mandatory meetings. Soon
after the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) concluded that workplace captive audience
meetings discussing unionization are per se unlawful. However, the NLRB re-
versed course following the enactment of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments
to the NLRA, concluding that employer free speech rights immunize captive
audience meetings from regulation. This remains the NLRB's view.
In this Article, I demonstrate that employers' First Amendment free
speech rights do not preclude a ban on captive audience meetings. Instead,
employees are a "captive audience" whom the Constitution protects from be-
ing force-fed the employer's religious and political ideology at the workplace.
Employers, accordingly, have no free speech right to coerce workplace ideo-
logical listening.
The scope of employers' constitutional right to free speech as juxtaposed
against employees'freedom not to listen is a timely issue. Several state legis-
latures are considering--and two have enacted versions of-the Worker Free-
dom Act, which bans workplace captive audience meetings discussing either
religious or political matters. Opponents of the Worker Freedom Act have ini-
tiated legal challenges that are in the early stages of litigation, and many
more such challenges are anticipated as more states adopt the Worker Free-
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dom Act. The employer's alleged free speech rights, as embodied in these
meetings, and preemption of state law by the NLRA will be two key issues in
this litigation. This Article demonstrates that the resolution of each of those
issues will depend on whether the reviewing court acknowledges that employ-
ees have a constitutionally-recognized freedom not to listen.
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"[Ujnreplying attention to the words of another is known immemorially as
an individual badge ofservility."
I.
INTRODUCTION
During the weeks preceding a union representation election, when
communicating with bargaining unit employees is most critical, the work-
place captive audience meeting is the employer's forum of choice.2 The
reason is simple: the captive audience meeting furnishes employers a "de-
cided advantage over the union." 3 The employer gains "virtually complete
access to the minds of [the employees] during work hours"4 while the union
normally is not entitled to a similar opportunity.s Employers stoutly defend
their legal prerogative to conduct these meetings because they are so highly
correlated with a favorable election day outcome.6
I Charles L. Black, Jr., He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 960, 966-67 (1953).
2 See Labor Relations Institute, Inc., Anti Union Campaign Tips-How Many Meetings,
http://lrionline.com/anti-union-campaign-tips-how-many (last visited Apr. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Anti
Union Campaign Tips] (stating that "[tihe captive audience meeting is management's most important
weapon in a[n] [anti-union] campaign"); see also Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of
Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing, Ithaca, NY 81 (Table 8) (2000), available
at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1002&context-reports/ (last visited June 29, 2009) [hereinafter Uneasy Terrain] (finding that employers
held captive audience meetings in 92% of 400 NLRB-conducted union representation elections con-
ducted between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 1999); JuLtus G. GETMAN, ET AL., UNION
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 90-92 (1976) (reporting that in twenty-eight of thirty-
one union representation elections conducted by the NLRB in 1972-73, the captive audience meeting
was a fixture of the employer's anti-union strategy and employees far more likely to attend such meet-
ings than union meetings held off the property).
See ALFRED DEMARIA, How MANAGEMENT WINS UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS xvii (1980)
(viewpoint from the perspective of an employers' labor consultant); see also Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pol-
lak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("When we force people to listen to another's
ideas, we give the propagandist a powerful weapon."); Anti Union Campaign Tips, supra note 2 (con-
cluding that "[i]f you hope to win your NLRB election, you must conduct a minimum of 5 captive audi-
ence meetings [and concluding that] the odds of a company victory increase with each captive audience
meeting held . . . ."; Uneasy Terrain, supra note 2, at 73 tbl.8 (concluding that of the 400 union repre-
sentation elections studied, the overall union win rate was 63% but in those where employers held cap-
tive audience meetings the union win rate was 43%).
4 See DEMARIA, supra note 3, at xvii.
5 See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953); discussion infra notes 58-61 and accompa-
nying text.
6 See DEMARIA, supra note 3, at xvii; see also id. at 9-10 (advising employer clients to schedule captive
audience meeting soon after discovering union organizing effort); Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer
Behavior in Certification and First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1987) (reporting
that a study of 261 union representation elections showed a correlation between number of captive audi-
ence meetings conducted and employer likelihood of defeating employees' effort to unionize); William
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But for the federal government's acquiescence, employers would not
enjoy this unilateral captive-audience-meeting advantage. Ever since the
NLRB withdrew its objection to the captive audience meeting in 1948, em-
ployers have been legally permitted to compel employees to listen to anti-
union proselytizing-under threat of discharge-in mandatory assemblies
during paid work time. The employer is entitled to discipline employees
who leave the captive audience meeting8 or who insist on participating by
asking questions or manifesting disagreement with the views being force-
fed to them.9 Further, the employer may prevent pro-union employees from
attending such meetings, deliberately isolating employees from co-workers
who might be able to rebut the employer's claims.' 0 It is not unprecedented
for an employer to lock all the exits at the workplace during a captive audi-
ence meeting and physically restrain those attempting to leave." The above
demonstrates that the NLRB and the courts have found nothing incongruous
between such forced anti-union indoctrination at the workplace and our na-
tional labor policy's commitment to employee free choice regarding union
representation. 12
T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law and Reality Once
Again, 36 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 570-71 (1983) (showing correlation between conducting cap-
tive audience meetings and anti-union outcome in representation elections).
See discussion infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (holding employer may discipline em-
ployee who leaves captive audience meeting).
NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 11 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding employer may discipline
employee attempting to interject question during captive audience meeting); J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc.,
219 N.L.R.B. 850 (1975), aff'd in part, J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 547 F.2d 792 (4th
Cir. 1976) (upholding discharge of employees who asked or sought to ask questions during a captive
audience speech or stood silently during anti-union speech). The Board's view is that the employer may
refuse to permit employee questions. Whether the employer may discipline employees who do ask
questions depends on an application of the principle that there
is a line beyond which employees may not go with impunity while engaging in protected con-
certed activities and that if employees exceed the line the activity loses its protection. That
line is drawn between cases where employees engaged in concerted activities exceed the
bounds of lawful conduct in a moment of animal exuberance or in a manner not motivated by
improper motives and those flagrant cases in which the misconduct is so violent or of such
character as to render the employee unfit for further service.
Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 51, 52 (1973). Compare Howell Metal Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 1136,
1137 (1979) (stating that "the Board has held consistently that discipline for having the 'temerity to ask
questions' during such meetings violates the Act, except when there is a scheme or plan to disrupt the
meeting") with Hicks Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 814 (1967) (discipline lawful when employees in
concert engage in a course of conduct designed to disrupt captive audience meeting).
10 See F.W. Woolworth Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980).
11 See Bonwit Teller, Inc. 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 622 (1951) (employer locked exits and physically restrained
some employees attempting to leave the premises).
12"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." 29 U.S.C. §
157 (2004). Known widely as employees' "section 7 rights," this guarantee is found in section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2004) [hereinafter the NLRA or the Act].
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An alluring question is why the courts should permit employers to as-
sert their superior economic dominance over workers in such an overtly co-
ercive manner in order to thwart unionization efforts.13  During the 1960s,
"industrial pluralists,"l 4 such as Derrick Bok," found nothing particularly
problematic in the captive audience meeting, for, as he observed, employer
speech serves a salutary function because, like political elections, union
elections depend on a well-functioning marketplace of ideas. Thus, accord-
ing to Bok, employer speech is instrumental in providing employees infor-
mation they need-but are not likely to obtain on their own-for informed
decision making regarding unionization.16
Bok's defense of the captive audience meeting acknowledged no coun-
tervailing employee interest in not being coerced into receiving an un-
wanted ideological indoctrination while captive at the workplace.' 7  Bok
perceived nothing "coercive" in these meetings, which he viewed as an as-
pect of "the right of management to run its business efficiently or to manage
its property as it sees fit."' 8 The critical consideration was simply whether
the employer's choice of tactic "contribute[s] to the exchange of views."1 9
This critique contains all of the core ingredients that have combined for
over fifty years to trump challenges to the legality of the workplace captive
audience meeting.
In this Article, I challenge the cornerstone of this defense of a right to a
captive audience forum-the assertion that employers possess a constitu-
tionally protected free speech right that immunizes captive audience meet-
ings from statutory proscription. Linking First Amendment freedoms with
the employer's coercive act of compelling employees to listen to anti-union
propaganda on pain of discharge fundamentally misconceives the nature of
1 As early as 1953, Board member Murdoch sounded the alarm when, dissenting in Livingston Shirt
Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 411 (1953) (Murdoch, dissenting) he stated that the captive audience meeting
is "one of the most potent and effective methods by which self-organization [can] be stifled." Former
Board member William Gould echoed Murdoch's concerns over fifty years later, stating that "the cap-
tive audience technique . .. has proved to be an extremely devastating technique in organizational cam-
paigns." William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of Labor-
Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461, 484 (2007).
14 See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 363 (1995). Story defines industrial pluralism as a view that both labor and man-
agement acknowledge that terms and conditions of employment will be established through a process of
joint determination that both is a non-adversarial process and recognizes the needs and equal power of
both sides. Id. at 445, 445 n.478.
15 See Derek Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38 (1964).
16 Id. at 49-51.
17 Indeed, Bok recommended subjecting employees to more, not less, coercion through captive audience
meetings by suggesting a rule that "the employer could not deliver a speech to his employees during
working hours within the last seven days of the campaign unless he permitted the union to do likewise . .
. ." Id. at 102.
18 Id. at 57.
19 Id. at 68.
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free speech. I argue that the First Amendment simply does not protect co-
ercing another into forced ideological listening. If, as this Article shows,
employees enjoy a constitutionally-based freedom not to be coerced into
ideological listening while they are captive at the workplace, then by exten-
sion the employer free speech right cannot include the right to coerce such
listening.
Previous assessments of captive audience meetings have not systemati-
cally evaluated the employer's free speech claim from the perspective of the
employee's constitutionally-protected freedom not to listen. Some recent
critiques of post-World War II labor relations policy have illuminated the
role of employer free speech in limiting employee rights under the National
Labor Relations Act.2 0 This scholarship argues that employer workplace
speech is inherently coercive and for that reason urges curtailment of its
First Amendment protection.21
This Article, however, does not proceed from the premise that em-
ployer speech is inherently coercive and ought to be suppressed. I instead
emphasize the employee's competing constitutional right-the freedom not
to be coerced into listening. I assume for purposes of this Article that em-
20 See, e.g., Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal
Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 495 (1993); Story, supra note 14.
21 One approach rests on the argument that employer workplace speech is inherently coercive due to the
unequal power relationship of employers and employees at the workplace and the dependency of em-
ployees on the continuing good will of their employers. See, e.g., Story, supra note 14, at 361 (interpret-
ing the preeminence that labor law has accorded to employer speech over employee interests as a thinly
disguised "attempt to reestablish stricter employer control of the workplace, to reassert traditional em-
ployer/employee hierarchies, and to dampen union advances"). Under this critique, the increased pro-
tection of employer free speech is seen as an "essential adjudicative baseline[] ... upholding . . . em-
ployer private property rights and maintaining workplace discipline." Id. at 356. "Within the
employment context, the abstract 'right' of free speech becomes the right to control and discipline and
provides scant utility to its supposed beneficiaries, voting employees." Id. at 357. The remedy, it is
argued, is to truncate the level of protection law grants employer speech. Id.
Another attack, also emphasizing the inherently coercive nature of employer speech, focuses on the
"silencing" effect on employee free speech resulting from employer speech. See Kate E. Andrias, Note,
A Robust Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Representation Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415,
2433-53 (2003) (arguing that the doctrine allowing employers to hold captive audience meetings as a
legal prerogative is based on this notion of employee servility, inherent in the at-will employment rela-
tionship). The reasoning here is that the loss of union representation elections caused by the inherently
coercive nature of employer speech causes employees to lose their voice at the work place. Id. Con-
comitantly, under-represented workers as a class are silenced in the broader political life of the country
as a weakened trade union movement becomes less able to make workers' voice heard in the national
political arena. Id.
Another related approach has argued that permitting the captive audience meeting constitutes an
endorsement of the view of the employment relationship as one of master and servant, in which employ-
ees are servile to the transcending power and authority of their employers. See Elizabeth J. Masson,
Note, "Captive Audience" Meetings in Union Organizing Campaigns: Free Speech or Unfair Advan-
tage?, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 169, 181 (2004) (stating that "[ilt is ironic that employers can fire at-will em-
ployees for refusing to attend a captive audience meeting, the purpose of which is to persuade employ-
ees to remain at-will employees, who are subject to discharge at the whim of the employer."). The
proposed remedy is adoption of union representation election rules that limit the scope of protected em-
ployer speech. Id. at 184-92.
FREEDOM NOT TO LISTEN
ployer speech and employee speech are both legitimate, that employers
have as much of a right to express their viewpoint about unionization as do
employees and unions. Yet, I contend that employer claims to free speech
and employee claims not to be forced to listen represent competing interests
that the law needs to accommodate.2 2 My core argument is that government
proscription of captive audience meetings poses no risk of trammeling em-
ployer free speech rights-not because employer speech is entitled to less
constitutional protection than is afforded free speech in general-but be-
cause the Constitution's free speech guarantees simply do not provide any
person the freedom to coerce listening.
In Part I, this Article demonstrates that the NLRB initially viewed the
captive audience meeting as per se unlawful. This view is consistent with
other NLRB prohibitions of employer anti-union tactics that depend on the
employer exercising its superior economic position over employees. I show
that, but for a supposed employer free speech right to conduct these meet-
ings, which caused a change in NLRB policy, the captive audience meeting
likely would still be unlawful today.
Next, I show that employers have no legitimate free speech claim to
hold captive audience meetings at the workplace because captive audience
meetings unlawfully interfere with employees' constitutionally-based free-
dom not to be coerced into ideological listening.23 When analysis of captive
audience meetings focuses on the employees' freedom not to listen, the in-
stability of the employer free speech claim justifying the captive audience
meeting's immunity from regulation reveals itself readily.
I conclude by showing that, in the absence of a valid employer free
speech claim justifying captive audience meetings, the government is free
to regulate these meetings in a manner that better balances employer and
employee rights and interests.24 Congress may reform labor laws to pro-
22 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 538 (1945) (holding that employer speech is "entitled to
the same protection [as the] espousal of any other lawful cause."); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) ("The Court has ... rejected the argument that political speech
of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply
because such associations are not 'natural persons."'); Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct.
2408, 2414 (2008) (holding that in the Taft-Hartley Act, "Congress renounced" the "judgment that parti-
san employer speech necessarily 'interferes with an employee's choice about whether to join or to be
represented by a labor union') (quoting 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 872, § 1); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 784 (1978) ("We find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendments, or in the decisions of
this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First
Amendment loses protection simply because its source is a corporation . . .
23 See discussion infra notes 62-195 and accompanying text.
24 Since the Constitution's protections of individual liberties apply only to government, not to private
entities or actors, clarifying employees' freedom not to be forced to listen to employers' ideological
proselytizing is not designed to establish a constitutionally-based private right of action against private
employers that invade this freedom by coercing listening among their employees. See, e.g., The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment is prohibitory on the
states, not "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights").
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hibit employer-sponsored coerced listening in the workplace. 2 5  Further-
more, an emphasis on the employees' freedom not to listen permits the
NLRB to return to its previous, internally consistent position that these
meetings necessarily violate employees' section 7 rights as guaranteed by
the NLRA, or at least violate the less-exacting "laboratory conditions" stan-
dard for determining whether a union representation election needs to be re-
run because employee free choice has been denied.26
Finally, an emphasis on employees' constitutional right not to listen is
important when evaluating preemption challenges to state legislation ban-
ning workplace captive audience meetings that promote the employer's re-
ligious or political views, legislation that many states either have enacted or
are considering. 27 Since freedom from the indignity and assault on con-
science arising from coerced listening has constitutional dimensions, re-
gardless of the content of the ideology being force-fed, state laws prohibit-
ing coerced ideological listening at the workplace should not be preempted.
II.
THE DOMINANCE OF EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH CLAIMS IN CONTEMPORARY
CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETING RULES
A. The Lawfulness of Captive Audience Meetings in the Absence of
Employer Free Speech Claims
When one eliminates employer free speech claims from consideration,
the argument that the workplace captive audience speech violates the
NLRA is straightforward and easily understood. Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA prohibits employer acts that "interfere with, restrain or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7" of the Act.28
Section 7, which implements that portion of national labor policy assuring
employees the "full freedom of association,"29 guarantees "[e]mployees . . .
the right to self-organization[] [and] to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions."30 Section 7 also assures employees "the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities."31  Thus, employees have the right to oppose self-
organization or choose to remain uninvolved in election contests. The legal
test of whether employer behavior interferes with employees' protected sec-
25 See discussion infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
26 See discussion infra notes 205-238 and accompanying text.
27 See discussion infra notes 277-344 and accompanying text.
28 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
29 "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States . . . [to protect] the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or pro-
tection." 29 U.S.C. § 151.
30 Id. § 157.
31 Id.
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tion 7 rights is an objective one: the Board asks whether "it may reasonably
be said [that an employer's action] tends to interfere with the free exercise
of employee rights under the Act."3 2
Absent considerations of employer free speech, therefore, the legal is-
sue determining the lawfulness of a captive audience meeting is whether an
employer's coercing employees into forced listening of an anti-union ideol-
ogy, on pain of discharge, reasonably "tends to interfere with the free exer-
cise of employee rights under the Act" including rights such as free associa-
tion and free choice to choose non-association.
One need not speculate what the NLRB would conclude. In 1946, dur-
ing a period when the NLRB did not acknowledge that employer free
speech considerations limited regulation of captive audience meetings, 33 the
Board in Clark Brothers concluded that captive audience speeches and
meetings constitute unlawful employer interference with freedom of asso-
ciation and employee free choice.34 That conclusion rested on two alterna-
tive rationales. The first is that the captive audience meeting interferes with
employee free choice regarding which advice to seek in deciding how to
exercise the freedom of association. In this regard the Board reasoned as
follows: 35
The Board has long recognized that "the rights guaranteed to employees by
the Act include the full freedom to receive aid, advice, and information
from others, concerning [the right to self-organization]." . . . Such freedom
is meaningless, however, unless the employees are also free to determine
whether or not to receive such aid, advice, and information. To force em-
ployees to receive such aid, advice, and information impairs that freedom; it
is calculated to, and does, interfere with the selection of a representative of
the employees' choice. And this is wholly apart from the fact that the [con-
tent of the] speech itself may be privileged under the Constitution.36
32 Am. Freightways Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1959).
In the first decade following the 1935 enactment of the Act, the Board held that employers must
maintain strict impartiality during union organizing campaigns on the theory that employer participation
in matters of employee self-organization is inherently coercive. See, e.g., Schult Trailers, 28 N.L.R.B.
975 (1941); Ford Motor Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 548 (1940). The most persuasive rendition of this theory was
written by Judge Learned Hand. See NLRB v. Federbush, Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941). That view
was short lived, for in 1941 the Court held in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469
(1941) that employers have a free speech right to express non-coercive views regarding unionization.
The NLRB responded by finding that some anti-union statements do not constitute violations of §
8(a)(1). See Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 806 n.12 (1946) (citing cases finding employer expres-
sion of anti-union opinion lawful).
Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, enforced as modified, NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373 (2d
Cir. 1947). The captive audience meeting in that case occurred shortly before the scheduled election,
but the Board's reasoning did not turn on that fact. Id. 804-06.
35 Id. at 805.
Id. at 805, 805 n.4 (citing Matter of Harlan Fuel Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 25, 32 (1938)). To this, the Board
added that the employer free speech claims were no impediment to proscribing captive audience speech-
es because the employer has reasonable alternative avenues to convey its views to employees and the
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Alternatively, the Clark Brothers Board found the captive audience
meeting unlawful based on the intimidating effect of the employer's de-
ployment of its superior economic power to force ideological listening. The
Board stated, "we must perform our function of protecting employees
against the use of the employer's economic power which is inherent in his
ability to control [employees'] actions during working hours."07 The Board
concluded that the employer "exercised its superior economic power in co-
ercing its employees to listen to speeches relating to their organizational ac-
tivities, and thereby independently violated Section 8[(a)](1) of the Act."3 8
In sum, when employer free speech claims are eliminated as a domi-
nating factor, finding that the captive audience tactic violates section 8(a)(1)
is elementary, either by focusing on interference with employee freedom to
choose which advice and information will inform the decision whether to
choose unionization or by focusing on the employer's use of superior eco-
nomic power over employees to manipulate the unionization decision. In
this latter regard, one commentator has summarized the intimidating effect
of such employer use of superior economic power to influence the election
outcome as follows:
The CAM [captive audience meeting] is a display of employer power, dem-
onstrating at once the employer's position of dominance at work and the
employees' vulnerability. It is difficult to think of other examples workers
would experience in their lives in which they could be forced to sit and lis-
ten to opinions with which they may strongly disagree. Due to the very un-
iqueness of the experience, the CAM transmits an extremely potent signal
to employees that is quite distinct from the content of the speech. It is a
message about where power in the employment relationship rests, about the
limits of a union's power . . ., and about the state's opinion of this imbal-
ance of power and communicative access in the workplace.
coerced listening "was not an inseparable part of the speech, any more than might be the act of a speaker
holding physically the person whom he addresses in order to assure his attention." Id.
37 Id. In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543 (Douglas, J., concurring), Justice Douglas, in a concur-
ring opinion joined by Justices Black and Murphy, argued that "no one may be required to obtain a li-
cense to speak. But once he uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to
influence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment."
38 Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. at 805. By adopting this reasoning to find a violation, the Board did not
need to rest on or adopt the reasoning of the portion of the Trial Examiner's (Administrative Law
Judge's) Intermediate Report in Clark Bros. referring to a "constitutional right of non-assembly." Id. at
805 n.7. The Second Circuit enforced the Board's order in Clark Bros. See Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d at
376 (2d Cir. 1947). Declining to hold that employers may never hold captive audience meetings, the
Court agreed with the Board on these facts because the employer had refused union representatives a
comparable opportunity to address employees.
See David J. Doorey, The Medium and the "Anti-Union" Message: "Forced Listening" and Captive
Audience Meetings in Canadian Labor Law, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 79, 80 (2008) (discussing
how the Canadian Labor Relations Board bans the use of captive audience meetings today on the theory
that employer exploitation of its economic power over employees to force listening interferes with legis-
latively guaranteed employee freedom of association and free choice whether to support unionization).
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In other contexts, the Board has no difficulty banning employer anti-
union tactics that depend on exploitation of the employer's superior eco-
nomic power to influence election outcomes. Promising or granting em-
ployees a benefit to influence the representation election outcome is a prime
example. In Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, the Court observed that
"[t]he action of employees with respect to the choice of their bargaining
agents may be induced by favors bestowed by the employer as well as by
his threats or domination."4o Similarly, in NLRB v Crown Can Co., the
court held that "[i]nterference is no less interference because it is accom-
plished through allurements rather than coercion." 4 1 In NLRB v. Exchange
Parts, the Supreme Court concluded:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of
a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference
that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which fu-
ture benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.42
Clark Brothers, Medo Photo Supply, and Exchange Parts thus all rest
on the unitary principle that the Act outlaws employer efforts to resist un-
ionization when the persuasive efficacy of the tactic chosen depends on suc-
cessful exploitation of the employer's superior economic power over em-
ployees. Coercive tactics based on the employer's superior economic
power over its employees are not synonymous with attempts to inform
through advocacy in a free marketplace of ideas, which is what the First
Amendment protects. Accordingly, the cases cited above show that em-
bedded in our national labor policy is recognition of the right of an em-
ployer to attempt to influence election outcomes by exploiting the superior-
ity of an idea, not protecting coercive anti-union tactics based on the
employer's superior economic power.
The rules regarding systematic polling of employees are another exam-
ple of the NLRB's deeply-held conviction that employers may not deploy
economic control over employees in an effort to influence election out-
comes. To be lawful, such polls must be for the purpose of verifying a un-
ion's claim of majority support; this purpose must be communicated to em-
ployees; assurances against reprisal must be given; and the polling must be
by secret ballot.4 3 The NLRB deems these extraordinary protections neces-
sary to protect against infringement on free choice regarding unionization.
"[A]ny attempt by an employer to ascertain employee views and sympa-
thies regarding unionism generally tends to cause fear of reprisal in the
40 321 U.S. 678, 686 (1944).
41 NLRB v. Crown Can Co., 138 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 769 (1944) (quot-
ing Western Cartridge Co. v. NLRB, 134 F.2d 240, 244 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 746
(1943)). These cases show that Congress has recognized the stifling effect of the grant of benefit (or its
promise) by exempting the promise of benefit from the scope of employer protected speech.
42 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
43 Struknes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967).
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mind of the employee if he replies in favor of unionism and, therefore,
tends to impinge on his Section 7 rights."44 The fear of reprisal inherent in
an employer's inquisition arises solely from the employer's superior eco-
nomic position enabling the employer to force employees to submit to such
questioning at the workplace and to retaliate when displeased with the em-
ployees' response.4 5
To be sure, the systematic poll is different from the captive audience
meeting since the non-secret ballot poll forces the employee to express an
observable choice in the presence of employer representatives. In this
sense, the systematic poll is akin to cases banning supervisors from offering
employees "Vote No" buttons 46 or videotaping employees at work for use
in an anti-union video and then asking those videotaped to request in writ-
ing if they wish not to be included in the video.47 Yet, underlying all of
these limitations on employer anti-union tactics is the common denominator
that each depends on successful exploitation of the employer's economic
power over his employees and thereby the employer's ability to control em-
ployee behavior at the workplace.
Sony Corp. of America48 explains this exquisitely. There, the Board
held it was unlawful for an employer to take pictures of employees and use
the images in anti-union videos without the employees' permission. The
reason this violates the Act is that the
showing of a photograph [in an anti-union video] to contradict the known
views of the union supporters whose pictures were used would tend to show
them and all the other employees that they were powerless to express their
beliefs in the face of the Company's wishes; the ability of the Company to
use their pictures would reinforce the feeling of futility in speaking out.4 9
44 Id. at 1062.
45 In Struknes the Board explained that "'[a]n employer cannot discriminate against union adherents
without first determining who they are.' That such employee fear is not without foundation is demon-
strated by the innumerable cases in which the prelude to discrimination was the employer's inquiries as
to the union sympathies of his employees." Id. (citing Cannon Elec. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1465, 1468
(1965)) (footnote omitted).
46 See, e.g., Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1978) (unlawful for supervisor to offer "Vote No"
buttons to employees as acceptance or refusal forces disclosure of sympathy for union during organizing
drive).
47 See Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 320 N.L.R.B. 484, 490 (1995), enforcement denied in part, 104 F.3d
1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997), clarified on remand, 333 N.L.R.B. 734 (2001), enforced, 301 F.3d 167 (3d Cir.
2002) (requiring written request not to be included in anti-union video akin to interrogation regarding
degree of support for union).
48 313 N.L.R.B. 420 (1993), overruled in part, Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 333 N.L.R.B. 734.
49 Id. at 428. Accord Valerie Manor Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 351 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1322-23 (2007)
(unlawful for employer to use signatures of pro-union employee on anti-union literature without permis-
sion, citing Sony Corp. ofAmerica and its reasoning). The best clarification of the Board's position on
this issue is found in Allegheny Ludlum Corporation., 333 N.L.R.B. 734, 745 (2001) (stating that "an
employer may not lawfully include the images of an employee in a campaign videotape, in circum-
stances where the videotape reasonably tends to indicate the employee's position on union representa-
tion, unless the employee volunteers to participate in the videotape under . .. noncoercive circumstances
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In sum, when employer free speech considerations did not dominate
the analysis of whether workplace captive audience speeches are lawful, the
Board consistently found that captive audience meetings violated section
8(a)(1) of the Act. These meetings, which coerce listening, interfere with
the section 7 right to exercise free choice to receive (or not receive) aid, ad-
vice, and information regarding the decision whether or not to support un-
ionization and the section 7 right to choose the sources from which to re-
ceive such aid, advice, and information. Further, the Board found that an
employer's exploitation of superior economic power to force ideology on
employees interferes with employee free choice in choosing or rejecting un-
ionization by implying a risk of retaliation if the employer's will "is not ob-
liged."50
B. The Emergence ofEmployer Free Speech Considerations in Shaping
Captive Audience Doctrine
Passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments5 ' marked the beginning
of a turnaround in the NLRB's and the courts' view of the lawfulness of
captive audience meetings. Particularly relevant was Taft-Hartley's addi-
tion of the free speech proviso to section 8(c), which states:
The expressing of any views, arguments or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or
be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit. 52
The influence of section 8(c) on the development of captive audience
doctrine transcends its literal language. Although the legislative history of
section 8(c) in the report of the Senate Labor Committee manifests an inten-
tion to overrule Clark Brothers,5 3 there is no indication that this Senate Re-
port reflected the views of a majority in Congress when it enacted section
8(c).54 Nevertheless, within one year following the addition of section 8(c)
to the Act, the NLRB reversed Clark Brothers in Babcock & Wilcox Co.,5 5
[and a]n employer may lawfully film employees, and present a campaign videotape including their im-
ages, without previously soliciting their consent to be filmed, only if the videotape, viewed as a whole,
does not convey the message that the employees depicted therein either support or oppose union repre-
sentation and the employer complies with [certain] requirements [assuring that employees whose images
are used are not unknowingly associated with the views in the video].")
50 NLRB v. Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
51 Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 104, 61 Stat. 136, 152 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169).
52 National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).
See S. REP. No. 105, at 23-24 (1947) (Senate Report), reprinted in NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 429-30 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 510, at 45 (1947)
(Conference Report).
See discussion infra notes 219-231 and accompanying text.
55 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).
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concluding in a one line statement that "the language of 8(c) of the
amended Act, and its legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine of
the Clark Bros. case no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor prac-
tices [based on conducting captive audience meetings]. 6
Babcock left unresolved the issue of whether the employer violates
section 8(a)(1) by conducting a captive audience meeting and then refusing
the union a similar opportunity to address employees. After oscillating on
this issue for several years,57 the Board in Livingston Shirt Corp.58 firmly
established that-in the absence of either an unlawful no-solicitation/no-
distribution rule, or a "broad but privileged" no-solicitation rule59-the em-
ployer's conducting of a captive audience meeting creates no concomitant
duty to provide the union an opportunity to address employees on the em-
ployer's premises. 60  Livingston Shirt, decided in 1953, still stands as the
controlling rule.61
56 Id.
5 Initially, the Board held that the employer owes the union no such "equal opportunity" duty. See S. &
S. Corrugated Paper Mach. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1364 (1950). That view soon gave way in Bonwit
Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 612 (1951), and Biltmore Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 905, 907 (1952), that,
together, established the rule that the employer cannot campaign against the union by holding a captive
audience meeting and then deny a union's request to address employees under similar circumstances. In
Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953) the Board returned to the no-equal-opportunity rule in
most cases. See discussion infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
58 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
The general rule is that "[n]o restriction may be placed on the employees' right to discuss self-
organization among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to
maintain production or discipline." NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). As
applied, the NLRB normally permits employers to ban solicitation only during working time. See, e.g.,
Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943). In unusual cases, an employer may choose to avail
itself of the privilege of promulgating and enforcing what is referred to as a "broad but privileged" no-
solicitation rule. See May Dep't Stores, 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 800 (1962) (referring to "broad but privi-
leged" no-solicitation rules). These are permitted upon the employer's demonstration of special circum-
stances necessitating promulgation and enforcement of a no-solicitation rule that bans solicitation, even
during non-work time, in certain work areas of the employer's premises, such as selling areas of the
store, in order to avoid customer confusion. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th
Cir. 1952); May Dep't Stores, Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), enforced, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946).
60 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. at 406-07.
61 In 1958 the Supreme Court decided two consolidated cases collectively known as the Nutone case-
NLRB v. Steelworkers (Nutone, Inc.) & NLRB v. Avondale Mills. 357 U.S. 357 (1958). Neither raised
the issue of the free-speech-protected nature of the captive audience meeting per se, but both did address
the question of whether an employer may ban pro-union speech at the workplace while itself engaging in
workplace anti-union speech. Id. The Court held that the employer's exercise of free speech to express
an anti-union viewpoint creates no duty to provide employees or the union an equal workplace opportu-
nity to express pro-union views unless the confluence of the employer's speech and the denial of an
equal opportunity to express a contrary viewpoint "create[s] an imbalance in the opportunities for organ-
izational communication." Id. at 362. Following Nutone, the Board reaffirmed its Livingston Shirt doc-
trine as striking a balance that is consistent with the rule in Nutone. See May Dep't Stores Co., 136
N.L.R.B. 797 (1962) (violation for employer to enforce a broad but privileged no-solicitation rule, con-
duct a captive audience meeting, and deny the union a similar opportunity to reply), enforcement denied,
316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963); accord Montgomery Ward & Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964), enforced as
modified, 339 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1989). The Board subsequently has been asked, but has refused, to
abandon the Livingston Shirt doctrine in favor of a rule requiring the employer to provide equal time to
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III.
THE EMPLOYEE'S FREEDOM NOT TO LISTEN AS A LIMITATION ON THE
EMPLOYER'S FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
It bears repeating at this point that although a private sector employer's
deployment of its superior economic power to force anti-union indoctrina-
tion on an unwilling employee does not constitute governmental action, that
ought not diminish the importance of acknowledging an employee's consti-
tutional freedom not to listen in the context of private labor-management
relations. When Congress or the Board considers banning the captive audi-
ence meeting, it must overcome the employer's claim that the proscription
violates its First Amendment protected right to hold these meetings. The
employer's constitutional defense fails because, as I show, the captive audi-
ence meeting infringes on the captive employees' liberty interest in being
free from coerced listening.62 Consequently, legislatures and the NLRB are
free-if they choose-to ban the captive audience meeting.
A. The Origins of the Freedom Not to Listen
1. The Freedom of Thought
The freedom not to listen arises from the freedom of thought. The re-
lationship between the two is quite linear. From the freedom of thought
comes the constitutional right to acquire the knowledge one requires to
form thoughts and beliefs. The freedom to acquire knowledge, in turn,
necessarily entails the autonomy to decide for oneself how one will acquire
knowledge and what knowledge one will choose and not choose to acquire,
for example, what ideas, arguments, and convictions one will choose to en-
ter the mind and influence the conscience. These related freedoms are all
well established in our constitutional traditions. 4
the union whenever it conducts a captive audience meeting. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co., 156 N.L.R.B.
1247 (1966) (concluding that it would be preferable to delay reassessment until the Board had a better
opportunity to evaluate the rule of Excelsior Underwear, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240-41 (1966), decided
that same term, which requires the employer to provide the union with names and addresses of employ-
ees eligible to vote in the upcoming union representation election).
62 See In re Rothenberg, 676 N.W.2d 283, 290 n.9 (Minn. 2004) ("[W]e have found no case where the
Supreme Court has applied the captive audience doctrine in the 'negative' sense, that is, where the gov-
emnment requires an individual to be 'captive' as opposed to protecting the individual from being cap-
tive").
63 See discussion infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
Charles Black spoke eloquently of the pedigree of the citizen's claim of a liberty right not to listen
over a half century ago. He said:
The objecting captive.. .. is fighting, after all, for a very old freedom, a freedom to which, in
some sense, all the others are dedicated handmaidens-the freedom of the mind. . . . Forced
listening attacks the mind's integrity with a new directness. Previous assaults have tended to
the slow starvation of the mind through reducing the vitamin content in its fare, or to its frus-
tration and atrophy through forbidding its exercise in expression. [With forced listening, a]
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Decided eighty-five years ago, Meyer v. Nebraska65 is the wellspring
of the freedom not to listen. Immediately following World War I, some
states banned the teaching of a foreign language. The ban on teaching
German adversely impacted schools that taught German extensively, such
as Lutheran parochial schools. 66 Such a law, enacted by the State of Ne-
braska, came before the Court in Meyer. Declaring the ban on teaching the
German language unconstitutional, the Court laid the foundation for a rich
body of freedom-of-conscience-based decisions that now permeate our First
Amendment heritage. Although the Court acknowledged the concomitant
rights of teachers to teach and parents to engage teachers to teach, the case
fundamentally turned on how the ban on learning German ravished "the op-
portunities of pupils to acquire knowledge."67 Only an authoritarian state,
the Court reasoned, seeks to control thought formation by impeding access
to knowledge, but under our system of freedom "[s]uch restrictions upon
the people of a state [do] violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion.""
Two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters69 the Court again re-
flected on the liberty of knowledge acquisition when considering the consti-
tutionality of Oregon's partial ban on non-public education. Pierce had
consolidated challenges that had been brought in two cases: one by a paro-
chial school and the other by a military academy. Often thought of as a
foundation case establishing parents' right to control upbringing of their
children, which it is, Pierce is more importantly a freedom of conscience
case. The Court unanimously found the Oregon statute unconstitutional,
reasoning that the Constitution does not permit making a child "the mere
creature of the state." 70 As the Court explained, "[t]he fundamental theory
of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to ac-
cept instruction from public teachers only."7  The Court implicitly pro-
claimed that none of us is a "creature of the state" and the state may not
"standardize" any of its people because each has a fundamental right to
man can no longer fall back to the last wall of keeping his mouth shut and calling his mind his
own.
Black, supra note 1, at 966-67.
65 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
66 See MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE 83 (rev. ed. 2003) (1957).
67 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.6 8 Id at 400-01.
69 Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names, & Pierce v. Hill Military Academy, 268 U.S. 510
(1925). Children between the ages of eight and sixteen were required to attend public school until they
completed the eighth grade. Id. at 530-31.
70 Id. at 535.
71 Id.
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form his or her own thoughts and beliefs and choose the sources of knowl-
edge from which these formations develop.72
Because the Constitution contains a textual commitment to both the
free exercise of religion and the ban on the establishment of religion, it is
easy to mistake the freedoms of thought and conscience that animate both
Meyer and Pierce solely as protections of the freedom to worship God in
one's own way. But, as shown, Meyer paints on a broader canvas than
freedom of religion and one of the two cases decided in Pierce was a mili-
tary academy. As Milton Konvitz explained over half a century ago,
"[p]olitical and religious totalitarianism are two sides of the same coin; nei-
ther can be accomplished without the other." 73 Conversely, "[i]f religion is
to be free, politics must also be free: the free conscience needs freedom to
think, freedom to teach, freedom to preach-freedom of speech and
press." 7 4  In short, the heart of the Constitution is recognition of the irre-
pressible need to form one's own beliefs through the process of acquiring
knowledge from sources of one's own choosing, whether those beliefs re-
late to religion, politics, economics, or trade unionism. "[R]ooted in Amer-
ican thought" is the conviction that "[m]atters of conscience were so impor-
tant that it was considered intolerable to delegate to others the power to
dictate with respect to them."7 5
The reserved liberty of the people to use their faculties, their conscious
mind, to develop beliefs and acquire knowledge to do so is part of our con-
stitutional culture. Meyer made clear that the term liberty "denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right . . to enjoy those
privileges . . . essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."76
In Palko v. Connecticut, the Court recognized that freedom of thought and
speech was an "indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of free-
dom.... [and that] the domain of liberty ... include[s] liberty of the mind
72 The freedom of the mind, of which the freedom of thought is an integral part, is a transcendent human
value. Seven hundred years ago, the Knights Templar, the most powerful military order of the Crusades,
was systematically disbanded, and its members persecuted. See Piers Paul Read, THE TEMPLARS 259-82
(1999). In the spring of 1310, following the systematic torture of Templar knights to exact confessions,
a Templar priest, Peter of Bologna, was deputized to defend the Order before a papal commission. His
timeless defense of the human spirit echoes in the Supreme Court's freedom of conscience cases today.
The torture the Templars had been subjected to, Peter of Bologna argued, "removed any 'freedom of
mind, which is what every good man ought to have."' Id. at 279.
Charles Black reports:
Classical antiquity affords one non-mythological parallel [to the contemporaneous insistence
on a right not to listen]. Of Nero, we learn that "when he appeared [as a musician] publicly,
his soldiers prevented the audience from leaving, though some jumped from windows and oth-
ers feigned death in order to be carried out."
Black, supra note 1, at 966 n.16 (1953) (internal citation omitted).
KoNVITZ, supra note 66, at 5.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 6.
76 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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as well as liberty of action." 7 Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opin-
ion in Olmstead v. United States, eloquently explained that:
The makers of the Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiri-
tual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part
of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be found in material
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations.
The above examples demonstrate that deeply rooted in our concept of
freedom is an immunity from totalitarian oppression that arises when au-
thority figures attempt to arrogate to themselves the power to indoctrinate
and interfere with the freedom of thought enshrined in our constitutional
heritage. Our legal philosophy of freedom of speech is freedom of commu-
nication, of which freedom to read and acquire knowledge of one's own
choosing are integral.
2. The Constitution's Captive Audience Doctrine
Recognition of the freedom of thought and the associated freedoms to
read and to acquire knowledge inexorably leads to recognition of freedom
of choice in listening, reading, and other means of acquiring knowledge.
These freedoms are an indispensable condition for the vitality of the free-
doms of thought and knowledge acquisition. It was from these roots that
the constitutional captive audience doctrine developed-the right of a cap-
tive not to be forced to listen, i.e., to choose what knowledge to acquire.
The Court has acknowledged many times the unwilling listener's stake in
the free speech matrix.
One of the earliest cases was Martin v. Struthers.79 There, the Court
recognized "the full right to decide whether [to] receive information"
brought to the home by door-to-door distributors of advertisements, even as
the Court rejected a blanket ban on all door-to-door solicitations.80 For as
the Court later explained in Kovacs v. Cooper, a case upholding restrictions
on use of a sound truck, the Struthers decision "never intimated that the vis-
itor could insert a foot in the door and insist upon a hearing., 8
Breard v. City of Alexandria82 even more forcefully anchored in the
Constitution a right to not be forced to listen. There the Court sustained an
ordinance prohibiting door-to-door canvassing by salesmen soliciting mag-
7 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
78 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (quoted in part in the unanimous opinion of the Court in United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950)).
79 319 U.S. 141 (1943).80 Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
81 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949).
82 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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azine subscriptions. The Court said that "[f]reedom of speech or press does
not mean that one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses.
Rights other than those of the advocates are involved.""
The decisions in Struthers and Breard involved those who are a captive
audience in their own home. Kovacs extended the captive audience princi-
ple for the first time beyond the home. The ordinance applied to sound
trucks anywhere on any city street. The principle of Struthers, and the
holdings in Breard and Kovacs suggest protection for the captive "unwill-
ing listener" wherever he or she is located.
These early cases are grounded on the principle that the essence offree
speech is the corresponding personal liberty interest in being free not to lis-
ten. The two are inextricably intertwined. Just as a free market connotes
not only a willing seller but also a willing buyer who is free to choose to
consume or not, so also the freedom of speech similarly connotes freedom
on both sides of the communication. The freedom to speak carries with it
only the opportunity to invite an audience from those who are free not to
listen. The essential nature of free speech is that it is not just the speaker
whose interest is protected-the listener also has a paramount constitution-
ally-recognized interest that must be accommodated.
3. Freedom Not to Speak Cases: Precedent for Demonstrating a
Constitutional Right Not to Listen
At first blush, the freedom-not-to-speak cases of West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette" and Wooley v. Maynard87 might seem off the
mark as precedent for demonstrating a constitutional right not to listen. Af-
ter all, these cases involved attempts to compel persons to make public ex-
pressions of fidelity to an idea with which they disagreed.88 Forced confes-
Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
84 336 U.S. at 78. Justice Jackson spoke of the right to "quiet enjoyment of home or park." Id. at 96
(Jackson, J., concurring). Subsequently, the Kovacs principle of quiet enjoyment from the unwanted
blare of a sound truck has been applied to contexts beyond the home. See Commonwealth v. Geuss, 168
Pa. Super. 22, 76 A.2d 500 (1950), affd per curiam, 368 Pa. 290 (1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S.
912 (1952) (citing Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77).
85 "The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but can-
not be made to take it. In his home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape this interference
with his privacy by loudspeakers except through the protection of the municipality." Kovacs, 336 U.S.
at 86-87 (emphasis added); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 50 A.2d 451, 453 (N.J. 1946) ("The freedom to
express one's opinions and to invite others to assemble to hear those opinions does not contain the right
to compel others to listen.").
86 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
87 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
In Barnette the compulsion was a flag salute imposed on a child who engaged in "reluctant and terri-
fled obedience to a command of secular authority which clashes with the dictates of conscience." Peo-
ple ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 18 N.E.2d 840, 847 (N.Y. 1939) (Lehman, J., concurring). In Wooley it
was state compulsion forcing a driver to carry the state motto "Live Free or Die" on a license plate,
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sion of belief may be seen as inflicting greater violence to the conscience
than forced listening, which does not require that the individual express
public acceptance of an unacceptable viewpoint. 89
Yet, these right-not-to-speak cases are apposite because they clarify
and reinforce the principle that the core of the guarantee of the freedom to
speak is the freedom of thought, the freedom of the mind, and the associ-
ated freedom of knowledge acquisition. As the Court said in Wooley, the
right not to speak derives from "the right of freedom of thought protected
by the First Amendment."o Indeed, "[t]he right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader con-
cept of 'individual freedom of mind."' 91 The evil in forced talking, like the
evil of forced listening, is that it "'invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to re-
serve from all official control.',, 92 The Court in Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. FCC stated: "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the prin-
ciple that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence." 93
Professor Emerson summarizes the relationship between the right not
to speak and the right not to listen as follows:
Compulsory listening is the counterpart of compulsory expression of belief.
The requirement that any person entertain a belief, opinion, or idea, or be
forced to listen to [another's] version of events, is an affront to dignity and
an invasion of autonomy . . .. Indeed, compulsion to listen is the hallmark
of a totalitarian society.94
4. Accommodating the Right ofFree Speech and the Right Not to Listen
The legal debate in modem cases has shifted to determining when gov-
ernment may protect the freedom not to listen, recognizing that when gov-
ernment protects the listener's freedom not to listen it does so most often by
limiting the speech rights of others. Courts must decide when circum-
which the Court described as compulsory "use [ofj private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the
State's ideological message." Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
89
Milton Konvitz argues, however, that "compulsory listening to speeches which shock the conscience
may be almost as unsettling, psychologically and spiritually, as forced confession of beliefs in politics or
religion that are contrary to one's convictions." KONVITZ, supra note 66, at 119.
90 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-34).
91 Id. (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
92 Id. at 715 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
93512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (emphasis added), af'don reh'g, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
94 Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 833 (1981).
Barnette and Wooley remind us of the totalitarian implications associated with all forms of coerced in-
terference with the freedom of thought. In Barnette, Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, observed
that "[t]hose who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. . . . Authority here is
to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
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stances warrant concluding that the listener's interest in not being forced to
listen is sufficiently strong to trump the free speech rights of the speaker,
i.e., when is the reluctant listener truly a "captive audience?"
Frisby v. Schultz9 5 is a paradigmatic example of the Court concluding
that the unwilling listener's interest surmounts the speaker's free speech
claims. There the Court sustained an ordinance banning targeted residential
picketing.96 The outcome largely turned on whether the state had a suffi-
ciently compelling interest in promulgating the ban. The ordinance recited
the primary purpose as "'the protection and preservation of the home'
through assurance 'that members of the community enjoy in their homes
and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy." 9 7  The
Court found this interest was sufficient to limit the free speech rights of the
picketers because the occupants of the homes being picketed were truly a
captive audience, explaining that "' [t]he State's interest in protecting the
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest
order in a free and civilized society."' 9 8 Indeed, "[o]ne important aspect of
residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener."99 Typically, the
Court reasoned "we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not
want to hear, [but] the home is different," because there the occupants are
truly a captive audience. 00
If the captive audience rationale for acknowledging a freedom not to be
forced to listen were limited to protecting the sanctity of the home, there
would be no credible basis for arguing that employees at work also are a
captive audience whose freedom not to listen to forced ideology warrants
95 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
96 The ordinance prohibited picketing "before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual." Id.
at 477.
Id. The Court also found that "[tihe Town Board believed that a ban was necessary because it deter-
mined that 'the practice of picketing before or about residences and dwellings causes emotional distur-
bance and distress to the occupants ... [and] has as its object the harassing of such occupants."' Id.
98 Id. at 484 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)). The Court also stated that "[o]ur prior
decisions have often remarked on the unique nature of the home, 'the last citadel of the tired, the weary,
and the sick,' and have recognized that '[p]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which
men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important
value."' Id. (internal citations omitted).
99 Id. The Court cited Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ("That we are often 'cap-
tives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech . . . does not mean we must
be captives everywhere."). Citing many previous examples of judicial recognition that "individuals are
not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the government may protect
this freedom," the Court concluded that "[i]n all such cases, we have been careful to acknowledge that
unwilling listeners may be protected when within their own homes." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. The
Court concluded that "[t]here simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener."
Id.
100 Id. The Court cited Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (drive-in theaters
along a highway) and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (public street near the city court
house).
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government protection. But the captive audience principle is not so cab-
ined.
As noted above, the government's right to ban sound trucks has been
extended to contexts other than invasion of the sanctity of the home.101
Moreover, early on, in Schneider v. State of New Jerseyl02 the Court stated
that the right to distribute literature on the streets extends only "to one will-
ing to receive it."o 3 In Fritz itself, the animating principle was not protec-
tion of the home but protection of those in the home who are captive by vir-
tue of being there. 10 4 The First Amendment principle is that government
may "prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience
cannot avoid the objectionable speech." 05
The Court's decision in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission of New Yorkl0 6 is particularly instructive in assessing the reach
of the captive audience concept beyond the home. There, customers ob-
jected to certain inserts that were placed in monthly utility bills, asserting
that they were a captive audience. The Court disagreed, concluding that
the ability of government 'to shut off discourse solely to protect others from
hearing it [is] dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.' [(citing Cohen v.
Calfornia, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).)] A less stringent analysis would permit
a government to slight the First Amendment's role in 'affording the public
access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and
ideas' . . . . Where a single speaker communicates to many listeners, the
First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit speech as in-
trusive unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid [objectionable] speech.107
In Consolidated Edison Co., the Court reiterated that this inability to
"avoid" speech of others that one finds objectionable extends beyond the
home and had been found among "[p]assengers on public transportation ...
[and] residents of a neighborhood disturbed by the raucous broadcasts from
a passing sound truck, . . . [who] may well be unable to escape an unwanted
message." 08 The final determination depends, in part, on the reasonable-
ness of any self-help alternatives to avoid the unwanted communication.
Accordingly, "customers who encounter an objectionable billing insert may
101 See discussion supra note 84 and accompanying text.
102 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
103 Id. at 162.
104 The home is one place a person is captive because "[t]he resident is figuratively, and perhaps liter-
ally, trapped within the home, and because of the unique and subtle impact of such picketing is left with
no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487.
105 Id. (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)).
106 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980).
107 Id. at 541-42.
108 Id. at 542 (citing Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in
the judgment); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).
109 Id. at 535
FREEDOM NOT TO LISTEN
'effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes."" 10
The public transportation cases, of which there are three,"' are particu-
larly illuminating. In Lehman v. Shaker Heights, the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the City's complete prohibition on political advertising in
its rapid transit cars, relying on the unique captive audience problems that
public transportation presents.112 Previously, the Court in Packer Corp. v.
Utah" 3 had sustained a ban on cigarette advertising on a billboard.1 4 The
Court in Lehman explained that the Packer decision
reasoned that viewers of billboards and streetcar signs had no choice or vo-
lition to observe such advertising and had the message thrust upon them by
all the arts and devices that skill can produce. . . . The radio can be turned
off, but not so the ... streetcar placard. The streetcar audience is a captive
audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not of choice. In such situa-
tions, [t]he legislature may recognize degrees of evil and adapt its legisla-
tion accordingly." 5
The more ideological the coerced message is, the greater the captive
audience's claim on government protection from coerced listening. Justice
Black explained this principle in his concurring opinion in Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollack:
Capital Transit's musical programs (which also include news and commer-
cial messages) have not violated the First Amendment. I am of the opinion,
however, that subjecting Capital Transit's passengers to the broadcasting of
news, public speeches, views, or propaganda of any kind and by any means
would violate the First Amendment."16
The decision in Lehman addresses, and concurs with, the distinction
Justice Black drew in his Pollack concurrence: that forced political indoc-
trination is a particularly virulent form of forced listening (viewing) justify-
ing governmental intervention."17
I 0 Id. (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21). The Court concluded that "[t]he customer of Consolidated Edison
may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring the bill insert from envelope to
wastebasket." Id.
I See Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
112 418 U.S. at 302-04.
113 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
114 The ordinance at issue made it a misdemeanor to advertise cigarettes on "any bill board, street car
sign, street car, . . . [or] placard," but exempted dealers' signs on their places of business and cigarette
advertising "in any newspaper, magazine, or periodical." Id. at 107
115 Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing Public Utilities
Comm'n, 343 U.S. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Packer Corp., 285 U.S. at 110).
1l6Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 343 U.S. at 466 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
117 As the Court held in Lehman, "[t]he city consciously has limited access to its transit system advertis-
ing space in order to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing
upon a captive audience. These are reasonable legislative objectives advanced by the city in a proprie-
tary capacity." 418 U.S. at 304.
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In Lee v. Weisman,"8 the Court concluded that even a school gradua-
tion, which nominally is voluntary, is viewed at law as creating a captive
audience among those attending because, as a practical matter, attendance is
obligatory.
The sequel to Lee was Santa Fe School Dist. v. Doe,1 9 an even more
striking example of the Court's willingness to eschew legal formalism and
evaluate captive audience status by probing the reality of one's ability to
avoid objectionable speech. At issue in Doe was the constitutionality of
student-led prayers prior to home football games. 120 The school district ar-
gued that football games are purely voluntary activities and any student de-
siring to avoid an unwelcome pre-game prayer simply can choose not to at-
tend.121 The Court disagreed. 12 2  Not only are there students such as
cheerleaders, members of the band, and team members themselves-all for
whom attendance is mandatory-but
[t]he district also minimizes the importance to many students of attending
and participating in extracurricular activities as part of a complete educa-
tional experience. As we noted in Lee, "[f]aw reaches past formalism.". . .
To assert that high school students do not feel immense social pressure, or
have a truly genuine desire, to be involved in the extracurricular event that
is American high school football is "formalistic in the extreme." . . . We
stressed in Lee the obvious observation that "adolescents are often suscepti-
ble to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence
is strongest in matters of social convention." . . . High school home football
games are traditional gatherings of a school community; they bring together
students and faculty as well as friends and family from years present and
past to root for a common cause. Undoubtedly, the games are not important
to some students, and they voluntarily choose not to attend. For many oth-
ers, however, the choice between attending these games and avoiding per-
sonally offensive religious rituals is in no practical sense an easy one. The
Constitution . .. demands that the school may not force this difficult choice
upon these students .... 123
In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser the Court concluded that stu-
dents attending a mandatory high school assembly constituted a "captive
audience." 12 4 The Court sustained discipline imposed on a student whose
speech to the assembled group contained sexual innuendos, concluding that
school authorities "[should] protect children-especially in a captive audi-
ence-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech."l 25
118 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
119 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
120 Id. at 294, 297-98.
121 Id. at 311.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 311-312.
124 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
125 Id.
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Perhaps the most powerful evidence of the flexible nature of the cap-
tive audience concept and its applicability beyond the home is the Court's
decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center.126  The Court there sus-
tained an injunction restricting speech in a thirty-six foot buffer zone
around a women's health clinic following prior unlawful conduct by dem-
onstrators interfering with patients' and staff's access to the facility.127 As
in the previous cases, a central issue was the governmental interest justify-
ing the challenged regulation, for it may burden no more speech than neces-
sary to serve a significant governmental interest.12 8 The Florida Supreme
Court concluded that the state had such a compelling interest, citing numer-
ous significant government interests the injunction protects, among them
the State's strong interest in residential privacy, acknowledged in Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), applied by analogy to medical privacy. The
[Florida Supreme Court] observed that while targeted picketing of the home
threatens the psychological well-being of the "captive" resident, targeted
picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but al-
so the physical, well-being of the patient held "captive" by medical circum-
stance. We agree with the Supreme Court of Florida that the combination
of these governmental interests is quite sufficient to justify an appropriately
tailored injunction to protect them.129
5. Conclusion
The past several decades have clarified much regarding the freedom
not to listen. It derives from the freedom of thought, which assures every
person the associated freedom to acquire knowledge, including the freedom
to decide what knowledge to acquire-which viewpoints to entertain and
which to avoid.130 The marketplace of ideas permits no forced orthodoxy.
This freedom to filter intellectual input into one's consciousness supports a
constitutionally recognized liberty interest in not being coerced into listen-
ing.131 This freedom not to listen trumps the speaker's right to speak, how-
ever, only when the listener cannot avoid the objectionable speech through
126 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
127 Id. at 757.
128 Id. at 754.
129 Id. at 767-68. The Court also recognized the need to protect the clinic staff, who as much as the pa-
tients were a captive audience with little practical choice but to go to work each day and confront the
picketers. As the Court stated, "[tihe 'physically approaching' prohibition entered by the trial court is
no broader than the protection necessary to provide relief for the violations it found. The trial judge en-
tered this portion of the injunction only after concluding that the injunction was necessary to protect the
clinic's patients and staff from 'uninvited contacts, shadowing and stalking' by petitioners." Id. at 781.
130 See discussion supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (stating that the "heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an indi-
vidual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his
mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.").
131 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) ("[T]he right of free speech includes a right to com-
municate a person's views to any willing listener .... ).
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reasonable efforts. 132 That is, the listener must truly be a captive audience.
Captive audience status turns not on legal formalism bur rather on the reali-
ties of one's ability, as a practical matter, to avoid the objectionable
speech. 133
B. Extending the Right Not to Listen to the Employment Context
Except for Madsen,134 the Supreme Court has had no occasion to con-
sider whether employees' degree of captivity at work justifies government
restraint on unwanted speech.13 5 When an employer compels the employee
to listen to anti-union proselytizing on pain of discharge, the legal issue is
whether, as a practical matter, the employee's "degree of captivity makes it
impractical for the unwilling [employees] to avoid exposure" to the un-
wanted speech. 13 6 Companies might contend that since the employment re-
lation is purely voluntary, employees can avoid exposure to the unwanted
speech by quitting their employment. The Court, however, has rejected
wooden logic or legal formalism: the practicality of one's ability to avoid
the unwanted speech defines the inquiry.13 7 Should an employee be denied
the government's protection from forced workplace listening because the
employee is literally free to "choose" discharge as an alternative to forced
listening? The reality is that employees offended by anti-union propaganda
in a captive audience meeting listen because that is their only real option.
"For many, if not most, employment is a practical necessity, and the eco-
nomic and other costs of changing jobs would often be prohibitive."'3 ' The
132 See discussion supra notes 100, 110-129 and accompanying text.
133 The offended listener has an obligation to avoid the unwanted speech if feasible. See Consol. Edison
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (inserts into utility bills mailed to resi-
dences); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (offensive images projected onto a
screen at a drive-in theater located along a highway); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (offensive
language written on clothing by one walking on a public street near the city court house).
134 Madsen upheld the thirty-six foot buffer limiting picketing at the women's health clinic both because
the patients and the staff were a captive audience, the staff apparently because of their need to pass the
picketers they encountered as they entered and left the clinic as part of their daily work routine. See
discussion supra notes 126-129.
"3 Cf NLRB v. Steelworkers (Nutone, Inc.) & NLRB v. Avondale Mills, 357 U.S. 357, 368-69 (1958)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (concluding that "[e]mployees during working
hours are the classic captive audience").
136 Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209.
137 See discussion supra notes I10-129 and accompanying text.
138 Richard Fallon, Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn't
Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 43. Fallon explains that:
In addition to the direct costs of finding a new job, leaving an established position often in-
volves forfeiting important benefits such as longer vacations, larger pension contributions, and
greater security against layoffs. Various studies have also noted the psychic costs of a job
change, such as disruption of familiar routines and the necessity of forming new social rela-
tionships.
Id. at 43 n.213 (internal citations omitted).
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"choice" to sacrifice one's livelihood in order to enjoy liberty is no choice
at all.
The view that the Constitution does not require employees to sacrifice
their present employment in order to avoid coerced ideological listening is
consistent with judicial precedent. Keeping one's current job is no less a
practical necessity than, for example, riding mass transit in Lehman: in
each there usually is no realistic alternative.139 The imperatives to continue
in one's present employment, and maintain important employment benefits
such as employer provided medical benefits, longer vacations, larger pen-
sion contributions, and greater security against layoffs far exceed the im-
peratives to attend the high school graduation in Lee or the football game in
Santa Fe School District, or to avoid study hall as a detention for failure to
attend the school assembly in Bethel School. These cases demonstrate that
[p]eople need not engage in heroic efforts before we will conclude [that]
they have sufficiently averted their eyes and plugged their ears [that is, that
they are a captive audience]. People need to work; expecting them to walk
past someone handing out leaflets on the sidewalk without accepting and
reading the flyer is not the same as requiring them to walk off their job to
avoid unwanted speech.140
The test whether one is a captive audience is whether avoiding unwel-
come speech is "impractical"-not impossible.141 In many instances it will
not be practical to quit one's present employment.14 2 Therefore, employees
fall well within the scope of the captive audience doctrine as the Court has
defined it.143
139 Lewis Maltby points out that Americans often are forced to sacrifice many things in order to keep
their jobs, sometimes including their civil rights:
The violation of individual rights is especially pernicious in light of most Americans' eco-
nomic dependence on their employers. For mediocre wages, people will tunnel deep under-
ground in dangerous coal mines; inhale dangerous fumes in manufacturing jobs; hang outside
skyscrapers as window washers; or endure verbal, emotional, and even sexual abuse. People
need their jobs, and many will sacrifice their rights as citizens to continue to provide for them-
selves and their families. Consequently, an employer that tries to use its financial muscle to
control employees' political behavior will often succeed.
Lewis Maltby, Office Politics: Civic Speech Shouldn't Get Employees Fired, LEGAL TIMES, August 29,
2005.
140 Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 872 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring)
141 See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209.
142 See Fallon, supra note 138, at 43 (stating "the case for extending the [captive audience] designation
to the workplace is strong. '[It] is ... typically infeasible to flee the workplace ... ; most working peo-
ple spend more hours per week on the job site than anywhere else except their homes-the place to
which the "captive audience" label has most regularly been applied."') (internal citation omitted).
143 This conclusion is consistent with the consensus in the academic community. See, e.g., Andrias,
supra note 21, at 2440; J.R. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 423 ("Few audiences are more captive than the average work-
er."); Fallon, supra note 138, at 43 ("[T]he case for extending the [captive audience] designation to the
workplace is strong."); Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address
Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 209, 210
(2008) ("[F]orcing employees to attend meetings during work to hear their employer's views ... repre-
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Moreover, at some point, law has to make sense. It makes no sense to
conclude that centuries of struggle to secure the freedom of the mind from
coercion should come to nothing more than the right to make a choice be-
tween subjecting oneself to forced indoctrination of what may well be a re-
viled point of view or quitting one's employment and sacrificing years of
investment in a job. Charles Black has put it this way:
The more I have thought about this captive audience business, the more it
has seemed to me that the case against it can be summed up in a single sen-
tence: It doesn't fit in.. . . It would be an awkward, stumbling job to try to
explain to a well-disposed foreign visitor that audience captivity is not just
"perfectly legal" but fully consonant with those of our aspirations and prac-
tices of which we are proudest before the world.144
Lower courts that have considered the question have concluded that
workers at the workplace are a captive audience. Construction workers, for
example, have been viewed as a captive audience protected from derisive
speech and noise from a sound amplification system.14 5 The issue has ari-
sen in the racially and sexually hostile work environment cases where
speech and other expressive conduct are central to proving the hostile
workplace claim.14 6  Here, the First Amendment does not bar proscribing
sents the worst type of misuse of employer economic power and interferes with employees' dignity in-
terests."); Story, supra note 14, at 414-18, 415-16 nn.309-19, 417-18 nn.325-34; id. at 417 ("Employees
during working hours are the classic captive audience."); Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Work-
place, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 5 (1990) ("Employees at work constitute a captive audience, and
the state has an interest in protecting these individuals from unwanted and unavoidable exposure to nox-
ious ideas."); Benson A. Wolman, Note, Verbal Sexual Harassment on the Job as Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, 17 CAP. U.L. REv. 245, 268 (1988) ("[I]f the First Amendment does not prohibit
a state from banning a benign political message to a captive audience on a bus, it is difficult to conceive
how it could preclude a state from attempting to control hostile and injurious messages to a captive au-
dience in the workplace"); cf Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment and
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 516-20 (1991) ("None of the captive-audience cases sup-
ports suppression of speech that is deemed 'harassing' under Title VII because none of these cases in-
volves suppression of speech because of the government's disagreement with the idea expressed or the
government's belief that the message was inherently harmful."). But see Eugene Volokh, Comment,
Freedom ofSpeech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1833 (1992) ("The Court has.
. . never found that employees in the workplace are 'captive,' and there are good reasons for it not to do
so.").
144 Black, supra note 1, at 969.
145 See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383, 402 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that con-
struction workers "are a captive audience, who must remain on the jobsite during the workday ....
[These] workers . .. are powerless to avoid bombardment by derisive speech and noise from the .. . de-
fendants' amplification system short of giving up their jobs [which they would do] except that there was
no other work available to them.").
146 See, e.g., Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (inter alia, posting a
derogatory article about African Americans on workplace bulletin board); EEOC v. Murphy Motor
Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. 381, 384-85 (D. Minn. 1980) (recurring uses of word "nigger" and other
demeaning racially-charged language when referring to two African American employees); Aguilar v.
Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring) (derogatory lan-
guage referring to Latino workers in claim arising under state fair employment practices legislation).
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racist speech, in part because workers are viewed as a captive audience. 14 7
Moreover, since the mid-1970s, courts have come to recognize hostile work
environment sexual harassment as actionable under Title VII.148 These hos-
tile environment cases often involve speech that is not overtly coercive or
threatening and in other contexts is constitutionally protected. For example,
in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., "the shipyard was filled with
pornographic images of women, in part because workers received calendars
full of such pictures from suppliers and were allowed to display them."1 4 9
The court issued a broad injunction against workplace displays of pornog-
raphy and harassing speech.150  It rejected a free-speech defense because,
inter alia, workers at the shipyard constitute a captive audience in relation
to the speech that comprises the hostile work environment.' 5'
Of course there is considerable forced listening that is incidental and
necessary to everyday work life. These employer communications do not
proselytize ideological views but rather have a reasonable nexus to mainte-
nance of workplace production, safety, and discipline.15 2 Such forced lis-
tening is clearly distinct from mandatory anti-union propaganda lectures
because the coerced anti-union indoctrination is not "inescapably incidental
[to the employer's business] but rather [is] itself a contrivance precisely
aimed at the coercion of listening [to ideology]."
Fashioning criteria to distinguish between forced listening that has a
direct and substantial relationship to legitimate business interests and forced
ideological indoctrination is something law easily can accomplish. For
years the courts have successfully drawn a related line in forced association
cases. The right not to speak includes the right not to be forced to subsidize
ideology financially.15 4 Accordingly, there are limits, for example, on forc-
ing lawyers to pay bar dues for ideological activities.155 Lawyers may only
be required to pay compulsory bar dues that are "reasonably incurred for the
purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of the
legal service available to the people of the State."156 Law has needed to de-
147 See, e.g., Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 871 (Werdegar, J. concurring).
148 Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815, 827-31 (1996).
149 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493-94 (M.D. Fla. 1991); see also Becker, supra note 148, at 828.
150 Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1539-41.
51 Id. at 1535-36 (stating that "female workers at JSI are a captive audience in relation to the speech that
comprises the hostile work environment. Few audiences are more captive than the average worker.").
152 Examples would include compulsory production meetings where workers are instructed regarding
safety, a new production process, shift assignments, the procedures for clocking out each day, legal re-
quirements to protect against racial or sexual harassment, employer attendance policies, or a host of oth-
er communications that have a reasonable nexus to the maintenance of workplace production, safety,
and discipline.
153 See Black, supra note 1, at 970.
154 See discussion infra notes 155-157.
155 See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
156 Id. at 14.
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velop standards to make the fine distinctions of which bar expenses satisfy
that test."s'
Similarly, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education the Court held that
collectively bargained compulsory union dues provisions covering public
employees may only be enforced with respect to that portion of union dues
used to finance activities germane to the collective bargaining process. 15  It
violates the Constitution for a public employer to require dues objectors to
pay that portion of union dues used for ideological activities with which
they disagree.159 Since Abood, the Courts have fashioned methods for mak-
ing fine distinctions between union activities that are ideological and those
that are germane to collective bargaining.160 Distinguishing between forced
listening that has a reasonable nexus to maintaining production, safety and
discipline at the workplace and that which does not is far less complex than
administering the holdings in Keller and Abood.16'
A more doctrinally intricate First Amendment question with respect to
government placing limits on workplace captive audience meetings in-
volves the normal First Amendment requirement that the regulation be con-
tent neutral. It would be unconstitutional, for example, for the NLRB to
ban employer anti-union workplace captive audience meetings but order the
employer to permit the union onto the work premises to present a manda-
tory pro-union speech. 162 The government may not take sides by burdening
one point of view or benefitting another. 63  But, viewpoint and speaker
157 Id.
158 431 U.S. 209, 235-236 (1977).
159 Id.
160 See, e.g., Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., 466 U.S. 435
(1984).
161 There always will be employer workplace speech that is on the margins with respect to whether it
constitutes a "captive audience meeting" used for ideological indoctrination. For example, at what point
is a supervisor's passing reference to some employer anti-union viewpoint in a casual conversation with
a group of employees so incidental to the discussion that it would be nonsensical to call this a "captive
audience meeting?" Law has had to fashion an answer to similar questions when, for example, an iso-
lated question by a supervisor has been alleged to constitute unlawful employer interrogation or a minor
act of misconduct has been alleged to be the basis for ordering a new election because it allegedly upset
the "laboratory conditions" required for employees to exercise free choice, and law no doubt can do so
again in the context of describing when a meeting constitutes a "captive audience" meeting force-
feeding ideology. See, e.g., Temp Masters, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 1188 (2005) (isolated inquiry not coer-
cive interrogation when in all the circumstances it did not appear to be seeking information upon which
to take action against individual employee); Bon Appetit Mgmt., 334 N.L.R.B. 1042 (2001) (describing
the test for determining when a new representation election will not be ordered because misconduct is so
de minimis that it could not have affected the previous election outcome); see also Rossmore House, 269
N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984), affid. sub nom. Hotel & Rest. Employees Union, Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d
1006 (9th Cir. 1985) (avowed support for union diminishes the coercive effect of interrogation and per-
mits employer more of a privilege to interrogate open union supporter).
162 See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (stating, "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter or its content") (emphasis added).
163 Id.
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neutrality are easily achieved when regulating workplace captive audience
meetings by simply banning all captive audience meetings at which em-
ployees are required to listen to either pro-union or anti-union ideology.
A limited ban on workplace captive audience meetings that prohibits
all mandatory discussion of unionization while excluding from regulation
all other captive audience meetings, such as those proselytizing political or
religious ideology, is somewhat more knotty. Such a ban, while viewpoint
and speaker neutral, is not subject matter neutral. The general rule describ-
ing when government may lawfully regulate speech requires that govern-
ment regulations of the time, place and manner of speech must not only be
viewpoint and speaker neutral but must also be subject neutral.'6 Accord-
ingly, the legal issue posed by a ban on all mandatory workplace captive
audience meetings that discuss the merits of unionization (but does not ban
other ideology) is whether such under-inclusiveness would render the ban
unconstitutional. As I show next, such under-inclusiveness is permissible.
First of all, the reason lack of subject neutrality creates grave constitu-
tional concerns1 65 is because "[1]aws of this sort pose the inherent risk that
the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to
suppress unpopular ideas or information or to manipulate the public debate
through coercion rather than persuasion." 6 6  In other words, under-
inclusive regulation of the subject matter of speech can be a marker for pre-
text. I argue that such under-inclusiveness is permissible when banning an-
ti-union (but not other ideological) captive audience meetings.
The NLRB's banning of workplace captive audience meetings involv-
ing discussion of union representation poses not the slightest risk that such
under-inclusiveness evidences a pretext for suppression of ideas or informa-
tion. Instead, such a ban advances the legitimate regulatory goal of protect-
ing workers from coerced listening. The NLRB is assigned the relatively
narrow regulatory authority to redress interference with the rights of em-
ployees that are guaranteed by section 7 of the Act-the right to engage (or
refrain from engaging) in concerted activities for mutual aid and protec-
tion.16 7 It is perfectly consistent with the NLRB's traditional role for Con-
gress to authorize the Board to regulate only those captive audience meet-
ings that have a nexus to employee decisions concerning union
representation. Thus, the under-inclusiveness here of not assigning the
NLRB responsibility for regulating other types of captive audience speech-
See discussion supra, notes 162-163.
165 Id.; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (ban on all picketing in residential neighborhoods
except labor picketing related to a place of employment unconstitutional because ban not subject neu-
tral).
166 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994), af'd on reh g, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); see
also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980) (holding that
lack of subject neutrality creates the risk of government manipulating the "search for truth").
167 See discussion supra notes 29-50.
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es such as forced indoctrination of political or religious ideology, is not a
marker for pretext.'6 8
The leading case evaluating the constitutionality of under-inclusive
regulations is R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.16 9  There, Minnesota regulated
fighting words, speech unprotected by the First Amendment.170 The regula-
tion was fatally under-inclusive, however, because the challenged statute
contained the content-based distinction of regulating only fighting words
arousing others to anger on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der.171 Fighting words arousing people to anger for any other reason were
not proscribed. Since the content-based distinction was "unrelated to [the]
distinctively proscribable content"l 72 of the speech (its fighting-words char-
acter), the under-inclusiveness manifested "hostility . . . towards the under-
lying message expressed," 7 3 thus violating the principle that government
may never regulate based on a hostility to a particular viewpoint.174
There are, however, exceptions to the R.A. V equality principle. In
R.A. V, the Court acknowledged that some content discrimination among
various subcategories within a class of proscribable speech is permissible
because the content-based discrimination does not raise the specter of gov-
ernment effectively driving certain ideas or viewpoints from the market-
place. 1 As an example, the Court posited that the federal government law-
fully could prohibit threats directed against the President-but not other
threats-"since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment .. . have special force when applied to the person of the Presi-
dent." 76
168 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is assigned the responsibility for redress-
ing employment discrimination based on race, religion, sex, national origin, and color. See Civil Rights
Act of 1964, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)).
The courts have not found pretext for unlawful regulation in Congress's authorization of the EEOC to
regulate speech related to certain forms of discrimination but not others, such as discrimination related
to how one chooses to vote in national elections.
169 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
170 Id. at 381.
171 Id. at 380.
172 Id at 384.
173 Id. at 386.
174 See Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (stating, "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter or its content").
175 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 387-88.
176 Id. at 388. "But the Federal Government may not criminalize only those threats against the President
that mention his policy on aid to inner cities." Id. A related example of under-inclusiveness that poses
no risk of being a marker for pretext for viewpoint discrimination is "[w]hen the basis for the content
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable . . . ."
Id. Justice Scalia gave as an example government choosing to regulate obscenity but choosing to regu-
late only the most virulent forms, such as obscenity which is most appealing to the prurient interest in
sex or the most patently offensive. Id.
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The Court returned to exceptions to the R.A. V. equality principle in
Virginia v. Black.'" At issue in Black was Virginia's ban on cross burning
with an intent to intimidate while not prohibiting or banning other acts in-
tended to intimidate.' 78  The Court excused Virginia's content-based dis-
tinction.179  Cross burning is a symbol of hate, the Court reasoned. The
state may selectively proscribe it because its historical use as a tool of in-
timidation has established it as "a particularly virulent form of intimida-
tion."180 Regulating the most virulent subcategories of unprotected speech
protects society from the worst of the harm that renders the speech constitu-
tionally unprotected in the first place. Such a content-based distinction is
not a pretext for viewpoint discrimination.' 8'
Choosing to regulate workplace captive audience meetings whose topic
is union representation but not other workplace captive audience meetings
similarly is constitutionally permitted because such a content-based distinc-
tion falls squarely within the exceptions to the R.A. V equality doctrine.
Government may thus single out for selective proscription captive audience
meetings whose subject is union representation because it is "a particularly
virulent form" of workplace coerced listening. This conclusion is justified
by the well-documented historical use of captive audience meetings to co-
erce employee listening at the workplace'82 for the purpose of interfering
with employee free choice and employees' section 7 rights. Therefore, se-
lective proscription here does not raise the specter that regulation is a pre-
text for viewpoint discrimination.
The most textually demonstrable evidence that content-based distinc-
tions are permissible when government legislates to protect the listener
from forced listening to an anti-union message is found in Erznoznik v. City
ofJacksonville.183 There, the Court cited Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights
for the proposition that:
A State or municipality may protect individual privacy [freedom not to lis-
ten] by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable
177 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
178 Id. at 347.
179 Id. at 359-63.
180 Id. at 363. The Court explained, by example, that a threat against the President is a particularly viru-
lent form of threat and the most patently offensive obscenity is the most virulent form of obscenity. Id.
11Id.
182 Since at least the years immediately following the enactment of the NLRA in 1935, employers have
used the captive audience meeting to indoctrinate employees to its views regarding trade unionism. See
discussion supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. Its use continued and grew following the 1947
Taft-Hartley Amendments, (see discussion supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text) and continues as a
forum of preference for the employer to express its anti-union views (see discussion supra notes 2-6 and
accompanying text). There is evidence that employers recently have begun to use their superior eco-
nomic power over employees to impose other ideologies, such as religious ideology. See discussion
infra notes 261-267 and accompanying text. But only the union representation-related workplace cap-
tive audience meeting carries the historical record as a tool of employer oppression and coercion.
183 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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to all speech irrespective of content... . But ... selective restrictions have
been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home, . . .
or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure.' 84
The Erznoznik Court's reliance on Lehman in the above statement of
"general principles" is important because Lehman found constitutional an
under-inclusive, content-based regulation that banned only political adver-
tisements from public transit placards.'18 In Erznoznik, the Court states, as
a blanket principle, that if the limitation on the freedom of speech is justi-
fied by the need to protect a captive audience from forced listening, gov-
ernment need not regulate all speech that invades the freedom not to listen.
It may regulate subsets of such speech based on subject matter, as in Leh-
man. 18 6 Taken literally, the Erznoznik principle would give government
carte blanche to engage in content-based distinctions based on subject mat-
ter whenever the justification for limiting speech is protection of a captive
audience.
A more cautious understanding of the Erznoznik principle would be to
merge it and Lehman within the exception to the R.A. V equality principle.
The political indoctrination banned in Lehman is the archetype of the co-
erced indoctrination the Constitution finds offensive. All forced indoctrina-
tion of transit passengers is evil but the Court might well have concluded in
Lehman that forced political indoctrination of transit passengers is a par-
ticularly virulent form of that evil. So understood, permitting regulation of
the political placard in Lehman is persuasive precedent that government
may choose to regulate the anti-union workplace captive audience meeting,
but not other workplace forced listening.
Imposing views on workers related to union representation, more than
other types of workplace ideological proselytizing, is the archetype of what
makes the workplace captive audience meeting proscribable. More than re-
ligious indoctrination and more than other attempted political indoctrina-
tion, forced-feeding of anti-union viewpoints via a mandatory captive audi-
ence meeting creates a particularly grave risk of interfering with employee
free choice. The show of force and control over employees inherent in
mandating their attendance at a captive audience meeting is particularly
chilling when the decision the employer is attempting to manipulate
through the forced listening is the employees' decision of whether it is safe
to choose unionization; because the employer's show of power to force
meeting attendance carries unique negative implications when unionization
184 Id. at 209-10 (emphasis added).
185 See discussion supra note 112 and accompanying text.
186 Nothing in Erznoznik suggests that the captive audience status of the listener would justify content-
based distinctions based on either viewpoint or speaker identity.
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is the subject of discussion,187 the risk of invasion of the freedom of the
mind is accordingly greater. Therefore, like the political placard in Leh-
man, and the burning cross in Black, government may reasonably conclude
that the anti-union captive audience meeting is a particularly virulent form
of unprotected speech and, for that reason, single it out for regulation.18 1
It also is worth emphasizing that employer efforts to force anti-union
views on employees is a particularly virulent form of forced workplace lis-
tening because interference with the freedom of thought regarding whether
to choose unionization has uniquely negative consequences to the public in-
terest. The public has a large stake in assuring optimum conditions for em-
ployees to exercise free choice regarding unionization because of unions'
important societal role as "a necessary countervailing force to perform both
democratic and economic functions."l 89
The union's democratic functions operate at the workplace through
collective bargaining and within the larger society through union participa-
tion in the political process. With respect to collective bargaining, it is well
understood that this process is more than a device to secure more favorable
wages and conditions of employment. The Commission on Industrial Rela-
tions of 1913-1915 summarized the principle that remains the foundation of
our national labor policy. Relying extensively on the testimony of Louis B.
Brandeis, the Commission urged that physical and material improvement of
the individual is a necessary, though not adequate, condition for a democ-
racy:
It is the development of manhood to which any industrial and social system
must be directed... . [T]here must be a division not only of the profits, but
187 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969), the Court acknowledged that employ-
ees' economic dependency on their employer will impede their ability to listen objectively to their em-
ployer's attempts to indoctrinate with respect to unionization. As the Court stated, "what is basically at
stake" during pre-election discussions about the merits of union representation "is the establishment of a
non-permanent, limited relationship between the employer, his economically dependent employee and
his union agent, not an election . . . where the independent voter may be freer to listen more objectively .
.. .. Id. For these reasons, "[a]ny assessment of the precise scope of employer expression ... must be
made in the context of [this] labor relations setting." Id. at 617.
Plus, at the workplace the employees' strongest need for protection of their freedom of thought is
with respect to attempted ideological indoctrination having a direct connection to workplace issues such
as whether or not to choose union representation. This is because "the plant premises and working time
are decisive factors during a labor dispute." NLRB v. Steelworkers (Nutone, Inc.) & NLRB v. Avon-
dale Mills, 357 U.S. 357, 368-69 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice
Warren may have concluded that "plant premises and working time are decisive" because it is there that
workers' thoughts are focused on work issues; that the buzz of discussion about union representation
that abounds at the plant during an organizing drive feeds thought formation about the merits of union
representation; that when the work shift ends, work issues fade in importance, as they necessarily need
to compete with the other aspects of one's life-family, friends, errands, etc.; and in short, workers have
a greater need for unobstructed thought formation at work with respect to the merits of union representa-
tion than matters related to other ideological subjects.
189 Roger C. Hartley, The Framework ofDemocracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 13, 40
(1982).
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a division of responsibilities; and the men must have the opportunity of de-
ciding, in part, what shall be their condition and how the business shall be
190
This concept-referred to as "industrial democracy"' 9 '-argues that
"[t]he struggle of labor for organization is not merely an attempt to secure
an increased measure of the material comforts of life, but is a part of the
age-long struggle for liberty. . . . Even if men were well fed they would
still struggle to be free." 92  The NLRA is rooted in such aspirations for
American workers.' 93
Unions' democratic function also extends beyond the workplace and
into the larger society. First, unions promote both industrial and political
stability.194  In addition, contemporary unions serve what may broadly be
termed a political representation function, seeking to stabilize workers' po-
litical power by acting as a counter-lobby to that of business and as a coun-
tervailing force to protect workers from the "tremendous state power inher-
ent in a collectivist society."' 9 5
190 BASIL M. MANLY, FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMM'N ON INDUS. RELATIONS, S. Doc.
No. 64-415, at 63-64 (1916).
191 Id. at 28-29, 40-49.
Id at 62. See generally JOHN R. COMMONS ET AL., HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 520
(1918). For a discussion of Commons's view of the democratic function of collective bargaining and an
excellent history of the development of industrial democracy during the early twentieth century, see Mil-
ton Derber, The Idea of Industrial Democracy in America: 1898-1915, 7 LAB. HIST. 259 (1966). See
generally Hartley, supra note 189, at 39-44.
193 Senator Wagner, echoing Brandeis's 1915 testimony before the Commission on Industrial Relations,
stated:
We can raise a race of men who are economically as well as politically free. . . . To me the
organization of labor holds forth far greater possibilities than shorter hours and better wages.
Organization plants in the heart of every worker a sense of power and individuality, a feeling
of freedom and security, which are the characteristics of the kind of men Divine Providence
intended us to be.
75 CoNG. REc. 4918 (1932).
194 The Wagner Act's Statement of Findings and Policies states that the denial of the right of employees
to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
are leading causes of strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest. National Labor Relations Act
§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). Accepting this view, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. took judicial notice that the refusal to negotiate "has been one of the most prolific causes of
strife" and, therefore, the right to self-organization is an "essential condition of industrial peace." 301
U.S. 1, 42 (1937). Moreover, testimony before the Senate Labor Committee advanced the view that
unions promote political stability because "organized labor in this country [is] our chief bulwark against
Communism and other revolutionary movements." IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS 332 (1970);
id. ("When workers can express and redress their grievances, they have no inducement to overthrow the
social order."); see also Hartley, supra note 189, at 44.
195 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., UNION DEMOCRACY 411-12 (1956). The strategies include par-
ticipation in community and local governmental affairs by designating nominees to sit on government
boards and administrative agencies, directly and indirectly influencing the election of state and local
political candidates, lobbying to influence legislation, endorsing candidates, and contributing large
amounts of time and money to influence national elections. See Hartley, supra note 189, at 58-61 (col-
lecting sources).
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Workers' claims upon the government to redress the affront to dignity
occasioned by the workplace captive audience meeting, therefore, are not
simply a request to protect some vague notion of individual self-
determination, as authentic as that request might be. Rather, workers' peti-
tion for acknowledgment of their right not to be coerced into listening to an-
ti-union propaganda is a request for freedom of thought to form opinions
about union representation, opinions that have a direct and significant bear-
ing on each worker's belief regarding how most appropriately to participate
in democratic self-government in the workplace. For this additional reason,
coerced listening to anti-union ideology is a particularly virulent form of
assault on the freedom of thought.
IV.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM CLARIFICATION THAT THERE IS No
FREE SPEECH RIGHT TO HOLD A CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETING
A. Implications for Congressional Labor Law Reform Legislation
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the normative question
of whether, as part of labor law reform, Congress should ban workplace
captive audience meetings. The above demonstration has the more modest
goal of unburdening the debate over labor law reform from employer claims
that such a ban violates employer free speech rights. The debate can then
focus on whether banning workplace captive audience meetings discussing
unionization is instrumental in advancing our national labor policy's free-
dom of choice goals.
If Congress bans pre-election workplace captive audience meetings,
should that ban apply to all representation election speeches to massed as-
semblies of employees on company time-including those where atten-
dance nominally is "voluntary?" Since its 1953 decision in Peerless Ply-
wood Co., the NLRB has invoked an absolute ban on all representation
election speeches to massed assemblies of employees during the twenty-
four hour period before an NLRB-conducted representation election. 96
While violation of this twenty-four hour rule is not an unfair labor practice,
it constitutes grounds for ordering a new election.197 The policy question is
whether to make the Peerless Plywood twenty-four hour rule applicable at
196 See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
197 Id. at 429. By enforcing the Peerless Plywood rule through an order for a new election, rather than
through the Board's unfair labor practice procedures, the Board in 1953 was able to avoid confronting
the question whether such a ban conflicts with the literal language of section 8(c), which provides that
employer non-coercive speech may not "constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice." National
Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006); cf Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782,
1787 (1962) (stating that in promulgating rules that provide for setting aside the results of a representa-
tion election, "the strictures of the first amendment, to be sure, must be considered in all cases").
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all times, for example, prior to the twenty-four hours preceding a union rep-
resentation election.'9 8
If Congress were to ban all mandatory workplace captive audience
meetings discussing unionization, Congress ought to also expand the Peer-
less Plywood rule to ban all "voluntary" representation election speeches to
massed assemblies of employees on company time because the employee's
choice whether to attend an anti-union speech to massed assemblies of em-
ployees on company time cannot realistically be voluntary. The threat of
coercion remains when employees know that supervisors know, and are
able to keep track of, those who choose not to attend. For a parallel exam-
ple, consider that labor law already bans supervisors from offering employ-
ees "Vote No" buttons because putting employees to the choice of accep-
tance or refusal discloses a worker's union sympathy during the union
organizing drive. 199 Although an employer's offer of a "Vote No" button
surely is a communicative activity, NLRB regulation is not constitutionally
problematic because offering the button interferes with employee free
choice.2 00 By similar reasoning, employers may not use the images of an
employee in a campaign videotape in circumstances where the videotape
reasonably tends to indicate the employee's position on union representa-
tion unless the employee volunteers to participate in the videotape under
noncoercive circumstances. 2 0 1 The rationale, again, is that it is unlawful for
an employer to use its superior economic control over employees to force
them to communicate their pro-union (or anti-union) views.202 Forcing em-
ployees to make a public choice of attending or not attending a work-time
anti-union speech to massed assemblies of employees similarly forces em-
ployees to reveal publicly their stance on unionization. In sum, banning all
campaign speeches to massed assemblies of employees on company time is
necessary to effectuate a ban on mandatory workplace captive audience
meetings and consistent with the mainstream of regulation under the
NLRA.
Would expanding Peerless Plywood to make it applicable at all times
violate employer free speech? This cannot be answered simply by arguing
employees' constitutional freedom not to listen because attendance at the
198 As is currently true under the Peerless Plywood rule, expanding it would not interfere with the rights
of unions or employers to circulate campaign literature on or off the work premises at any time prior to
an election. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 618 (1966). Nor would it bar the use of any other
legitimate campaign propaganda or media. See Pearson Educ., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 979 (2001) (stating
that "the Peerless Plywood rule . . . does not apply to posters or other campaign literature"). In addition,
current law does not prohibit employers or unions from making campaign speeches on or off company
premises if employee attendance is voluntary and on the employees' own time. Peerless Plywood Co.,
107 N.L.R.B. at 430.
199 See, e.g., Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1978).
200See discussion supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
201 See discussion supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
202 Id.
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meetings is nominally "voluntary" and employers may argue that one is a
captive audience only if forced to listen. But there are several adequate re-
sponses to such potential free speech challenges. For over sixty years, the
Peerless Plywood rule has been applied without constitutional infirmity
since it is enforced merely by ordering a new representation election when
the rule is violated.203 There is no reason to believe that similarly enforcing
an expanded Peerless Plywood rule should raise any credible First Amend-
ment concerns. In any event, if employees continue to be coerced into at-
tending nominally voluntary anti-union meetings conducted during work
time, then a forced listening problem exists and the employee is a captive
audience. If the enjoyment of the freedom not to listen depends on banning
all speeches discussing unionization to massed assemblies of employees
during company time, then such a ban is a constitutional means of protect-
ing the captive employee's freedom not to listen.204
B. Implications for NLRB Action Without Legislative Amendment
Clarifying that the employer has no free speech right to hold workplace
captive audience meetings raises the question of whether the NLRB pos-
sesses authority, on its own, to return captive audience doctrine to the rule
of Clark Brothers.2 05 This question cannot be resolved merely by showing
that such administrative reform is not constitutionally problematic, for the
question remains whether section 8(c) of the Act bars a return to Clark
Brothers even if the First Amendment does not. It will be recalled that in
Babcock & Wilcox Co. the Board reversed Clark Brothers, concluding in a
one-line statement that "the language of 8(c) of the amended Act, and its
legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Brothers case
no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor practices [based on con-
ducting captive audience meetings]."206 Subsequently, however, the NLRB
softened its characterization of the preclusive effects of the legislative his-
tory of section 8(c) with respect to maintaining the Clark Brothers rule,
concluding that the legislative history of 8(c) "contains adverse comment
203 See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 427, 431 (1953).
204 One may fairly assume that not all First Amendment concerns are addressed simply because the re-
medy for a violation of a Board rule is a rerun of a representation election rather than a finding of unfair
labor practice conduct. See Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 (1962) (stating that in prom-
ulgating rules that provide for setting aside the results of a representation election, "the strictures of the
first amendment, to be sure, must be considered in all cases."). Thus, if ordering a new election creates
a mild residual First Amendment concern, it would need to be balanced against the need, in fact, to pro-
tect the captive employee from coerced listening by banning workplace captive audience meetings that
nominally are voluntary.
205 Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946) (holding that mandatory captive audience meetings are per
se unlawful); see discussion supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
206 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).
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upon the Board's decision in Clark Bros. that a captive audience is per se
unlawful."207
The question presented is, does the current text of section 8(c) or its
legislative history mandate reversal of Clark Brothers? With respect to the
language of section 8(c), the Board's assertion in Babcock that section 8(c)
self-evidently mandates reversal of Clark Brothers cannot withstand scru-
tiny. On its face, 8(c) protects from governmental restraint only the content
of speech that is expressed or disseminated,208 not the mode of its expres-
sion.2 09 The fatal flaw in the Babcock reasoning is that it conflates protec-
tion of speech content and protection of the manner of expression of that
content. The Board's implicit assumption about 8(c)-a view not supported
by the language of 8(c)-is that if the content of speech is not coercive, the
means of dissemination is irrelevant. But this cannot be so. Otherwise one
would need to conclude that Congress intended to protect from NLRB regu-
lation even extreme modes of communication such as an employer's pre-
rogative to hold a loaded gun to an employee's head to force an anti-union
message on the employee as long as the content of the message "dissemi-
nated" contains "no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 210 The
threat of temporal or physical harm is an independent, separable considera-
tion from the content of the message. The act that coerces the listening is
conduct, not protected speech. In passing 8(c) Congress did not intend to
immunize from NLRB regulation all conduct constituting the act of dis-
semination as long as the content of the message is not coercive.
A more plausible understanding of the Board's reasoning in Babcock is
that the Board's intent was to state that, even if the language of section 8(c)
does not require reversal of Clark Bros., section 8(c) incorporates the First
Amendment, which protects the employer's right to hold captive audience
21121meetings.21 The Court's decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company 2
207 Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 612 (1951) (The Board did not cite the legislative history of §
8(c) to which it was referring.).
208 Section 8(c) provides that the expression or dissemination of "view[s], argument[s], or opinion"
shall not constitute an unfair labor practice unless such views, etc. are coercive. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)
(emphasis added).
209 This is true at least when the mode of expression is not an inseparable part of non-coercive speech.
As the Board concluded in Clark Brothers, the captive audience speech is "not an inseparable part of the
speech any more than might be the act of a speaker holding physically the person whom he addresses in
order to assure his attention." 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 805 (1946).
210 National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2004).
211 See Andrias, supra note 21, at 2439-41 (collecting cases demonstrating that the NLRB and the courts
sanction employer captive audience meetings based on the conclusion that such meetings are an exercise
of protected employer free speech); see, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 498-
99 (8th Cir. 1946) (refusal to enforce NLRB order finding employer violated Act by conducting a man-
datory work time captive audience meeting concluding employer has a free speech right to hold such
meetings); cf Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953) (suggesting that employer auton-
omy to choose how to "use ... his own premises" supports the prerogative to hold captive audience
meetings).
212 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
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supports the major premise of that reasoning-that 8(c) implements the
First Amendment. In Gissel, the Court stated that "8(c) merely implements
the First Amendment . . . ."2 13 But, as shown above, the First Amendment
creates no right to coerce captive audience listening. It is, therefore, likely
that Babcock reversed Clark Brothers on the mistaken belief that the First
Amendment required reversal, which was not an irrational view given some
judicial precedent that existed in 1948. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit two years
previously, in NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., had articulated a startling
rendition of the freedom of speech, reasoning that the First Amendment
concerns itself with the speaker's or writer's freedom of thought and ex-
pression "not with the conditions under which the auditor or listener re-
ceives the message" and, accordingly, "a legitimate consequence of free
speech and presumably one of its purposes [is to permit employers to] in-
fluenc[e] [employees] against their will."2 14
Montgomery Ward offers a window into the state of First Amendment
doctrine, in the minds of some, immediately following World War II when
the rights of a captive audience were just beginning to be understood more
clearly.215 The Montgomery Ward case reinforces the conclusion that the
Board's abandonment of the precedent in Clark Brothers was the result of a
misguided understanding of the freedom not to listen. Based on an invalid
constitutional premise, Babcock therefore holds no claim as binding prece-
dent. There is nothing in the language of 8(c) or NLRB precedent that pre-
cludes the NLRB from choosing to return to the rule of Clark Brothers.2 16
213 Id. (emphasis added).
214 Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 498-99 (1946). In Montgomery Ward & Co. the court
stated:
One need not, as a condition precedent to his right of free speech under the First Amendment,
secure permission of his auditor. The First Amendment does not purport to protect the right of
privacy, nor does it require that the audience shall have volunteered to listen. .. . Speech is
very frequently invoked as a means to persuade those who do not agree with the speaker and
may not even wish to hear him. . . . The employees were paid for attending and were not in-
convenienced in the least. If they were influenced against their will by the arguments pre-
sented, this was a legitimate consequence offree speech and presumably one of its purposes.
Id. at 498-99 (emphasis added).
215 See discussion supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. One might have imagined that the World
War 11 generation, which had just defeated three totalitarian regimes, and had sacrificed so much in the
effort, readily would have understood the totalitarian implications of a constitutional view permitting
coerced listening as a vehicle to instill ideological conformity. See Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative
Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REv. 795, 833 (1981) ("[C]ompulsion to listen is the hallmark of
a totalitarian society.").
216 One caveat, of course, is that return to the rule of Clark Brothers requires that there be a case prop-
erly before the NLRB raising the captive audience issue. That, in turn, requires cooperation from the
NLRB General Counsel who controls the decision of which cases should be put before the Board for
adjudication. See National Labor Relations Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2004) (stating that the
NLRB general counsel "shall have final authority . .. in respect of the investigation of charges and issu-
ance of complaints . . . and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board."). This
Board authority is not judicially reviewable. See also United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366
F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966) (affirming the NLRB General Counsel's statutory authority to make independ-
ent prosecutorial decisions).
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But what of Babcock's statement that the "legislative history [of sec-
tion 8(c)] make[s] it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Bros. case no longer
exists as a basis for finding unfair labor practices [based on conducting cap-
tive audience meetings]"? 2 17 Even if the language in 8(c) implements the
First Amendment and the First Amendment does not protect the right to co-
erce listening, does the legislative history of 8(c) nevertheless "make it
clear," as the Board stated in Babcock, that Congress intended to reverse
Clark Brothers when enacting the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments? 218 A
close examination of the legislative history reveals no basis for such a con-
clusion.
Three documents comprise the relevant portions of the section 8(c) leg-
islative history. The Taft-Hartley Amendments began with a bill in the
House of Representatives. The House Committee on Education and Labor
issued a Report containing a brief reference to what became section 8(c).2 19
Following passage of the bill in the House of Representatives (H.R. 3020),
the Senate took up its version, and the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare issued a report that proposed substantial amendments to the
House bill and contained a short discussion of what became section 8(c).220
Following enactment by the Senate of its version, a conference committee
considered the House and Senate versions and issued a report that mostly
adopted the Senate version, with only scattered amendments from the origi-
nal House version. One of the House version provisions the conference
221adopted ultimately became section 8(c).
Congress's overriding concern in all of these reports was the Board's
perceived misuse of its powers to rely on the content of speech, which was
not itself coercive, as evidence of unfair labor practice conduct and to use
past unfair labor practice conduct as evidence that employer speech is coer-
cive.222 There is no reference in the House Report to objections to the regu-
lation of captive audience meetings in general or the rule of Clark Brothers
specifically. The sole concern when enacting section 8(c) was protecting
217 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).
218
Though sparse, there is academic commentary agreeing that § 8(c) was intended to reverse Clark
Brothers. See Bok, supra note 15, at 103 n. 179 (concluding that "the intent of Congress [in enacting §
8(c)] was simply to restrain the Board from using the employer's speeches as evidence that unrelated
acts were motivated by antiunion animus and to put a stop to Board rulings that 'captive audience'
speeches by the employer were per se coercive."); see also H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 45 (1947) (Confer-
ence Report); S. REP. No. 80-105, at 23-24 (1947) (Senate Report).
219 See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 8 (1947) (reporting on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. (1947)).
220 See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 23-24 (reporting on S. 1126, 80th Cong. (1947)).
221 See H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 45.
222 For example, the House Report states that "it is apparent from decisions of the Board itself that what
persons say in the exercise of their right to free speech has been used against them. The bill provides
that the new Board is prohibited from using as evidence against an employer . .. any statement that by
its own terms does not threaten force or economic reprisal." H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 8 (emphasis add-
ed).
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content of speech, "what persons say" and then only content that falls with-
in "the exercise of their [constitutional] right of free speech." 22 3
The Senate amendment of the House bill similarly focuses on objec-
tions to the Board's reliance on non-coercive content in employer speech as
a basis for finding employer unfair labor practices. As the Senate Report
states:
The Supreme Court ... held. . . that the Constitution guarantees freedom of
speech on either side in labor controversies . . . . The Board has placed a
limited construction upon these decisions by holding such speeches by em-
ployers to be coercive if the employer was found guilty of some other unfair
labor practice, even though severable or unrelated ....
It was here in the Senate Report that Clark Brothers is referred to. The
Senate Report disapprovingly states that the Board holds
speeches by employers to be coercive . . . if the speech was made in the
plant on working time. (Clark Brothers, 70 N.L.R.B. 60). The committee
believes [this] decision to be too restrictive and, in this section, provides
that if, under all the circumstances, there is neither an expressed or implied
threat of reprisal, force, or offer of benefit, the Board shall not predicate any
finding of unfair labor practice upon the statement.225
The Conference Committee's action is important for determining
whether congressional enactment of section 8(c) was intended to reverse
Clark Brothers. After reciting that "[b]oth the House bill and the Senate
amendment contained provisions designed to protect the right of both em-
ployers and labor organizations to free speech," 22 6 the Conference Report
then states that "the conference agreement adopts the provisions of the
House bill. . . with one change from the Senate amendment." 2 27
The Conference Report also explains:
The practice which the Board has had in the past of using speeches and pub-
lications of employers concerning labor organizations and collective bar-
gaining arrangements as evidence, no matter how irrelevant or immaterial,
that some later act of the employer had an illegal purpose gave rise to the
necessity for this change in the law. The purpose is to protect the right of
223 Id.
224 S. REP. No. 80-105, at 23.225 Id at 23-24.
226 H.R. REP. No. 80-5 10, at 45.
227 Id. (emphasis added). A comparison of the House bill and the Senate amendment shows that the
"one change from the Senate amendment" was the scope of the § 8(c) protection. See Rebecca Hanner
White, The Statutory and Constitutional Limits of Using Protected Speech as Evidence of Unlawful Mo-
tive Under the National Labor Relations Act, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 14 (1992).
Both the House and Senate were in agreement on the need for language protecting employer
'free speech.' But there was disagreement on the scope of protection that should be provided.
After extensive debate, the final version of section 8(c) contained language, originating in the
House, that provided that noncoercive speech not only would not constitute but could not be
evidence of an unfair labor practice.
Id.
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free speech when what the employer says or writes is not of a threatening
228nature or does not promise a prohibited favorable discrimination.
There is no reference in the Conference Report to reversing the
Board's then-current policy on captive audience speeches as set out in
Clark Brothers. Instead, the clear intent is "to protect the right of free
speech . ,229 Thus, one readily can see why the Court in Gissel con-
cluded that "8(c) merely implements the First Amendment ... 230 More-
over, both the House and the Senate, and certainly the Conference, were fo-
cused on the First Amendment's protection of the content of speech-"what
persons say in the exercise of their right to free speech."2 31 One clause in
one sentence of a Senate committee report that the conference committee
rejected is a thin reed indeed upon which to conclude that the entire United
States Congress in 1947 enacted section 8(c) with the intent to reverse
Clark Brothers. A far more reasonable conclusion supported by the section
8(c) legislative history is that, contrary to what the Board in Babcock
found,2 32 section 8(c) does not preclude the NLRB from banning anti-union
workplace captive audience meetings. Both the language and legislative
history of 8(c) indicate that Congress merely wanted to provide statutory
assurance that the NLRB would interpret the First Amendment in such a
way to guarantee the employer's full free speech rights as those rights are
defined and protected by the First Amendment.2 33 And, as this Article has
argued, the employer enjoys no First Amendment freedom to coerce its
workers to listen to its ideological proselytizing.
The above notwithstanding, it is fair to question whether the courts
would enforce an NLRB decision banning captive audience meetings. The
Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.234 strongly suggests that they would defer to such a doctrinal
change. Chevron requires that judicial review of agency action proceed in
two steps. If the text or legislative history of the statute manifests a clear
and unambiguous congressional intent regarding the issue before the court,
the statutory text or legislative history is determinative of the issue and the
228 H.R. REP. No. 80-5 10, at 45 (emphasis added).
229 Id.
230 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
231 See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 8 (emphasis added).
232 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).
233 The Board was on the defensive in 1948, the year it decided Babcock. For the first time in thirty
years the 1946 congressional elections had placed Republican majorities in both houses of Congress; the
Board was under attack by this 80' Congress; and the NLRB had just successfully fought off efforts in
the House to abolish the NLRB and create a new board to hear cases and an agency to prosecute cases.
See HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROwN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 363-84
(1950); Gerard D. Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285,
288-91 (1960). It may have been expedient for the Board to jettison Clark Brothers in an abundance of
caution by over-reading the section 8(c) legislative history.
234 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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inquiry ends.2 3 5 But, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court becomes whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."23 6
This Article has demonstrated that neither the text nor the legislative
history of section 8(c) provides clear and unambiguous evidence that Con-
gress intended to require reversal of Clark Brothers when it enacted 8(c).
The Board, therefore, may provide a "permissible construction of the stat-
ute"-and banning captive audience meetings is such a permissible con-
struction. It previously was the NLRB rule and there is no reason to believe
that it would not have remained the Board rule over the past sixty years but
for a misreading of the scope of employer free speech and Congress's intent
in enacting section 8(c).237 Under Chevron, the courts of appeals should
uphold an NLRB decision returning captive audience doctrine to the rule in
Clark Brothers.238
235 Id. at 842-43, 843 n.9.
236 Id. at 843.
237 See discussion supra notes 34-61 and accompanying text. Nor should the Court's decision in NLRB
v. Steelworkers (Nutone, Inc.) & NLRB v. Avondale Mills, 357 U.S. 357 (1958), prevent the federal ap-
pellate courts from enforcing NLRB unfair labor practice orders predicated on employers conducting
captive audience meetings. In Nutone the Court heard two consolidated cases, one of which involved
Avondale Mills. In that case, during work time, "supervisory personnel interrogated employees con-
cerning their organizational views and activities and solicited employees to withdraw their membership
cards from the union." Id. at 360. Among other things, the Board held that enforcing a no-solicitation
rule against employees in the context of the above activities by supervisory personnel constituted unlaw-
ful discrimination. Id. at 360-61. The Court disagreed, concluding that a violation of the Act depended
on a finding that the confluence of the supervisor's work-time activities and enforcement of a rule bar-
ring employees from soliciting for the union during work time created an "imbalance in the opportuni-
ties for organizational communication." Id. at 362. The case did not litigate the permissibility of em-
ployer captive audience meetings. Id. at 358-63. Employees who were interrogated by the supervisors
were a captive audience but that fact was incidental to the core dispute, which was the right of the em-
ployer to enforce rules barring work time solicitation that it did not hold itself to. Id. Chief Justice War-
ren, dissenting, argued that the Court should defer to the NLRB, which had found a violation in Avon-
dale in part because the context of the employer's behavior had included making threats to a captive
audience of employees. Id. at 368-69 (Warren, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Avondale
thus is not a case where the Court considered, or rendered any decision regarding, the permissibility of
the Board returning to the rule of Clark Brothers and holding that captive audience meetings are per se
unlawful.
238 The Ohio State Employment Relations Board has adopted the position that any captive audience ac-
tivity will be deemed to fatally flaw the free and untrammeled conditions required for a valid election,
and thus is a per se violation of the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act and mandates a
rerun election. See Ohio Civil Service Employees Association and Hamilton County Welfare Depart-
ment, 3 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. 3036 (1986) (stating that "[t]here are conceivable constitutional
arguments against public sector captive audiences [and] [a]t least it is arguable that a public sector em-
ployer's compelled audience meets the state action element requisite to a claim of violation of the 14th
Amendment" but deciding the case based on an interpretation of state law); accord Ohio Council 8,
AFSCME and Noble County Engineer, 2 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. 2632 (1985); Ohio Council 8,
AFSCME and Belmont County Engineer 2 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. T 2652 (1985).
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C. Implications for State Legislative Action
Protecting constitutionally recognized freedoms through state legisla-
tion is a traditional state function, deeply-rooted in local feeling and respon-
sibility.239 Freeing state legislative policy from the misconception that em-
ployer constitutional rights of free speech immunize it from regulation of
workplace captive audience meetings that invade the freedom not to listen
permits state legislatures to focus on the merits of such bans 240 and insulates
such bans from successful attacks based on labor preemption. 24 1
1. The Government's Dual Constitutional Roles
The Constitution imposes a dual role on government. First, govern-
ment may not itself engage in "state action" infringing rights protected by
the Constitution absent a showing that infringement is necessary to advance
242a compelling state interest. But, in addition, government may have a
constitutional obligation, and certainly has a traditional right, to take an ac-
tive role in protecting its citizens from privately inflicted harms to constitu-
tionally-recognized interests. 243
The states' active role in protecting individual constitutional freedoms
from infringement by private parties may take the form of legislation di-
rectly doing so. Massachusetts, for example, has enacted legislation creat-
ing a private right of action in state court for any individual whose enjoy-
ment of rights guaranteed by the laws or Constitution of the United States
or the state's own constitution have been interfered with, whether under
color of state law or not.24
239 See discussion infra notes 242-260 and accompanying text.
240 See discussion infra notes 261-284 and accompanying text.
241 See discussion infra notes 288-344 and accompanying text.
242 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1978) (interference with fundamental constitu-
tional right to marry constitutional only when necessary to advance a compelling state interest and thus
not lawful if state has adequate alternatives that are less harmful to constitutional rights).
243 I do not intend here to enter the debate over whether the government's obligation to enable the Con-
stitution's rights is of constitutional dimensions. Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago City Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (stating that "our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses
generally confer no affirmative right to government aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual" and
thus the government has no constitutional duty to protect individuals from privately inflicted harms),
with CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 47 (1995) (concluding that
"the First Amendment .. . is not entirely a negative right. It has positive dimensions as well [consisting]
of a command to government to take steps to ensure that the system of free expression is not violated by
legal rules giving too much authority over speech to private people"). I, more modestly, show that pro-
tecting free speech from infringements by private entities is a state interest that is deeply-rooted in local
feeling and necessity.
244 See Kolodziej v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 634, 637 (Mass. 1992) (stating that "G.L. c. 12, § I 1H (1990
ed.), authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action in the Superior Court '[w]henever any per-
son or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion . .
. with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person or persons of rights secured by the constitution or
laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth . . . .'
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In addition, states enact laws regulating defamation in an effort to pro-
tect a constitutionally-recognized liberty interest in the preservation of
one's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity."245 This state interest in
protecting the liberty interest in reputation from infringement is deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility.2 46
The anti-discrimination laws enacted by many state and local jurisdic-
tions are another example of state or local legislation protecting persons
from privately inflicted harms to constitutionally-recognized interests. In
Roberts v. United States Jaycees the Court upheld application of the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act prohibition of private discrimination based on race
and gender. 247 The Court held that the state had a compelling state interest
that is unrelated to the suppression of ideas, for example, elimination of
discrimination based on race and gender, both constitutionally-recognized
liberty interests. Through similar reasoning, the Court has upheld a Cali-
fornia statute requiring the Rotary Club to admit women 2 4 8 and has upheld a
New York City ordinance banning discrimination among certain private
clubs.249
In addition to the above, states traditionally protect by statute private
infringement of many other rights the Constitution protects from govern-
ment infringement, including laws protecting the constitutional right of
freedom of association from being infringed by private parties, 250 laws pro-
tecting the freedom from coercion in choosing how to vote in state and local
Section I II grants a private cause of action to any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of such rights
has been interfered with . . . .").
245 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971).
246 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975) (requiring some procedural due process prior to
suspension from school because discipline "could seriously damage the students' standing with their
fellow pupils and their teachers . . . ."); Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 575. This constitutional right to due
process attaches at least when the harm to reputation is accompanied by some tangible detriment, such
as loss of employment. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 661 (1980) (obligation to
provide procedural due process to discharged public employee when government disseminates "a false
or defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his termination"); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-61 (1985) (permissible for state to en-
force defamation laws protecting reputation that include presumed or punitive damages when defama-
tion is of a private person and does not entail a matter of public concern); Gertz v. Welsh, 418 U.S. 323,
347 (1974) (permissible for states to enforce defamation laws involving defamation of a public figure, or
a private person where the defamation does entail a matter of public concern, "so long as [state defama-
tion laws] do not impose liability without fault" or impose punitive damages without requiring a show-
ing of malice); cf Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1976) (no due process owed when public
employer does not disseminate information harming the reputation of discharged public employee); Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (holding that interest in good name rises to a protected liberty inter-
est only if accompanied by harm to some tangible interest).
247 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)
248 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
249 N.Y. State Club Ass'n. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
250 Commc'n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
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elections, 251 and laws requiring that members of the press testify at grand
jury proceedings and at criminal trials.252  Moreover, states "play an active
role . . . in enabling the free speech principle that the Constitution estab-
lishes" through enactment of legislation creating a statutory right of access
to the private property for the purpose of engaging in speech-related activi-
ties ("access legislation").25 3 All of the foregoing are examples of state law
protecting constitutionally recognized interests from being harmed by pri-
vate entities.
In addition, and as shown above, state and local governments may pro-
tect captive audiences in their homes from intrusions by door-to-door solici-
torS254 and targeted picketing,255 persons on the street from being forced to
receive unwanted handbills,256 transit passengers from being forced to view
unwanted political propaganda posted to placards on transit vehicles, 257
school students attending a mandatory high school assembly from private
speech containing sexual innuendos,258 medical patients' right not to listen
to unsolicited messages, 259 and, finally, the rights of workers not to be co-
erced into listening at their place of employment. 2 60
The above makes no pretense of constituting a complete inventory of
state and local legislation designed to protect rights guaranteed under the
251 See Maltby, supra note 139, at 44. Twenty-nine states have enacted some form of statute to protect
political liberties from employer infringement. Id. Missouri, for example, has enacted legislation that
prohibits an employer from "'threatening to inflict any loss against anyone in his employ in order to
compel such employee to vote or refrain from voting for any particular candidate."' Id. The most
sweeping protection is legislation enacted by Califomia and four other states, which provides that "no
employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy controlling or directing, or tending
to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees." Id.
252 See discussion of this legislation in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
253 See Anna M. Tarushhio, Note, The First Amendment, The Right Not to Speak and the Problem of
Government Access Statutes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1013-19 (2000) (cataloguing federal and
state legislation designed to expand free speech by requiring access to private property).
254 See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1952); dis-
cussion supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
255 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988); discussion supra notes 95-101 and accompanying
text.
256 See Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (concluding that the right to distrib-
ute literature on the streets extends only "to one willing to receive it"); discussion supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
257 See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); discussion supra notes 112-117 and accompa-
nying text.
258 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-86 (1986); discussion supra notes 124-
125 and accompanying text.
259 See, e.g.,Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
260 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (protecting
captive audience female employees from a hostile work environment pursuant to state law); Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383, 402 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that construction workers "are a
captive audience, who must remain on the jobsite during the workday .... [These] workers ... are po-
werless to avoid bombardment by derisive speech and noise from the ... defendants' amplification sys-
tem short of giving up their jobs [which they would do] except that there was no other work available to
them."); discussion supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
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Constitution from infringement by private parties. It does demonstrate,
however, that doing so is a state interest deeply-rooted in local feeling and
responsibility and a traditional governmental function. Accordingly, when
state legislatures protect the freedom not to listen by banning all workplace
captive audience meetings in which the employer espouses its political or
religious ideology, states are acting within a rich and deeply-rooted legisla-
tive tradition.
2. Coerced Religious and Political Indoctrination at the Workplace
The First Amendment foundations of the right not to be coerced into
listening and the rich tradition of state legislative efforts to protect constitu-
tional interests from private infringement merge when states enact legisla-
tion to ban all coerced ideological proselytizing at the workplace. The
workplace captive audience meeting, once just the mainstay of a communi-
cations strategy to indoctrinate employees with the employer's anti-union
views, 261 has begun to morph into a vehicle for religious and political indoc-
trination.262 For example, during the 2008 presidential election the National
Association of Manufacturers is reported to have urged members to assem-
ble employees at the workplace to "discuss political issues" and "act in their
employer's best interest by not voting for unacceptable candidates." 2 63
There are also reports that during the 2008 election "Wal-Mart forced
workers to attend meetings in which managers told them [that] electing
Democrats to the White House and Congress could threaten their jobs."2 64
Religious proselytizing in the workplace is also on the rise. One
source is "[e]vangelical Christian organizations [that] are offering Christian
ministry services for employers to provide to their employees during work
hours." 26 5 These services include prayer breakfasts and faith-based training
and education.2 66 The National Workrights Institute reports that "many em-
261 See discussion supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
262 See discussion infra notes 263-276 and accompanying text.
263 Secunda, supra note 143, at 224.
264 Mike Hall, Oregon Bill Bans Mandatory Anti-Union Meetings, AFL-CIO Now BLOG, June 19,
2009, http://blog.aflcio.org/2009/06/09/oregon-bill-bans-mandatory-anti-union-meetings/#more-15048.
265 Secunda, supra note 143, at 225; see Corporate Chaplains: Praying for Gain, ECONOMIST, Aug. 25,
2007, at 76, available at 2007 WLNR 16426531 (Westlaw) (concluding that Corporate chaplains are a
booming business in America, that there are roughly 4,000 of them, that Marketplace Chaplains USA,
based in Dallas, Texas, is America's biggest provider of corporate chaplains, employing 2,100 of them
at 300 companies in forty-six states, and that "Corporate chaplains can perform the role of traditional
village priests").
266 Id. Baseball Chapel is an evangelical Christian organization whose web site states that "[o]ur pur-
pose is to glorify Jesus Christ." http:/www.baseballchapel.org/ (last visited July 22, 2009). It supplies
volunteer chaplains to major and minor league baseball teams to lead Sunday morning Christian prayer
meetings among both the players and the umpires of all major league and minor league baseball teams
soon before the beginning of a game. See Murray Chass, Should a Clubhouse Be a Chapel?, N.Y.
TtIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at DI. The chaplains come to the umpires' locker room and, as one non-Christian
umpire has reported, "they preach to you [and] [a]t the end they ask if there is anything you want me to
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ployers feel it is their religious duty to convert workers and thus employ ...
corporate chaplains, many of whom have conversion as part of their official
mission."267
Title VII and state anti-discrimination law do not provide a complete
remedy for this coerced workplace religious indoctrination. For example,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ordered an em-
ployer to cease subjecting captive audience employees to daily broadcasts
of prayers over the employer's public address system, concluding that such
activity constitutes a hostile work environment. 2 68  However, the EEOC
concluded that, "in order to establish a case of harassment that creates a
hostile working environment, the harassment of which appellant complains
generally must be ongoing and continuous . . . ."269 In that case the prayer
broadcasts had continued on a daily basis for a year, notwithstanding that
plaintiff had asked that they be stopped. 270 That year-long pattern of broad-
casted prayers, the EEOC concluded, constituted the required "ongoing and
continuous" conduct. 2 7' A less consistent pattern of religious indoctrination
might well have resulted in a different outcome.
In Brown v. Polk County, the court found that during mandatory de-
partmental meetings a supervisor had permitted prayers, affirmed his Chris-
tian faith to the assembled employees, and referenced "Bible passages re-
lated to slothfulness and 'work ethics."' 2 72 Yet, the court found no violation
of Title VII because the prayers were voluntary and spontaneous and the ac-
tivity occurred with sufficient irregularity to render it "inconsequential as a
legal matter."2 7 3
Also, in Kolodziej v. Smith, the court found nothing unlawful under the
United States Constitution, state constitution, or state law when an em-
pray for." Id. It is reported that at a Washington Nationals prayer meeting the chaplain indicated his
approval of the view that "Jews were doomed because they didn't believe in Christ." Id. While these
prayer meetings nominally are voluntary, as a practical matter there is great compulsion not to vacate the
room where they are held because there often is no other place to go. Id. Players may leave and mingle
with the fans, though the more appropriate (and unpleasant) alternative is often to go outside, where the
temperature may have reached 100 degrees, especially at minor league day games in the South. Id.
Players also may feel compelled to stay in the prayer meetings because among baseball umpires the
promotion system from minor leagues to major leagues is precarious and depends on the good will of
the more senior umpires, some of whom are religious and welcome the prayer meetings; the perception
is that choosing not to be part of the group could affect your chances. Id. One outside observer has
concluded that "there probably is a perceived coercive element in this movement in that if you're not
part of it you are somehow suspect ... . There's this social obligation that very often is felt among a
small group of cohorts, and in small quarters that makes it difficult." Id.
267 Worker Freedom Act Gains Momentum, Workrights News, Spring-summer, 2006, http://
www.workrights.org/newsletters/summer06newsletter.pdf
268 Hilsman v. Runyon, 1995 WL 217486 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 31, 1995).
269 Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
270 Id. at *3-.
271 Id. at *3.
272 61 F.3d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1995).
273 Id. at 656.
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ployer threatened to discharge an employee who refused to complete a
mandatory week-long seminar built around a core of Christian theology.274
The court reasoned that:
the seminar . . . was in no sense devotional . . . . There is no evidence . . .
that the defendants have forced the plaintiff to alter her religious convic-
tions or her profession of belief, or to give the appearance of supporting a
particular tenet of religion [nor evidence that the employer] required [plain-
tiff] to miss any religious service or to compromise her faith [or] that Ro-
man Catholic dogma forbade her attendance at the seminar.275
The employer plainly had denied plaintiff the enjoyment of her free-
dom not to listen by attempted inculcation of a particular brand of religious
dogma, but existing state law provided no relief.276
3. State Legislative Response: The Worker Freedom Act
Because existing statutory law often fails to protect adequately against
private infringement of the constitutional right not to listen, state legisla-
tures throughout the United States are considering legislation to outlaw all
workplace captive audience meetings that attempt political or religious
proselytization. This legislation is called the Worker Freedom Act. These
laws create an intentional tort enforced through a civil private right of ac-
tion for damages.
Two states already have enacted such legislation. On July 6, 2009, the
governor of Oregon signed Senate Bill 519, the "Worker Freedom Act." It
prohibits employers from punishing workers for choosing not to attend
work time meetings that discuss the employer's opinion on religious issues
or political matters, such as ballot measures and union organization. 27 7
Oregon was the second state to enact such a bill.
New Jersey enacted a modified Worker Freedom Act in July 2006, en-
titled the "Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act,"278 which
prohibits all forms of discipline for refusal to attend regulated captive audi-
ence meetings at the workplace. The statute provides for a civil remedy,
274 588 N.E.2d 634, 636 (Mass. 1992).
275 Id. at 638-39.
276 The case was remanded to provide plaintiffan opportunity to file charges under Title VII. Id. at 639.
277 See Atty Says Ore. Labor Law Likely Preempted, LAW 360: THE NEWSWIRE FOR BUSINESS
LAWYERS, July 7, 2009, available at http://employment.1aw360.com/registrations/user-
registration?articleid=109786&concurrency-check-false (last visited, July 8, 2009). The bill provides
an exception for churches and political parties. See Peter Wong, Bill That Was High Priority for Labor
Unions Passes, STATESMAN JOURNAL, June 20, 2009, at C3. The Oregon Worker Freedom Act has
been challenged on a variety of grounds, including labor preemption. See Complaint, Assoc. Ore. Indus.
v. Avakian, No. 09-CV-1494 (D. Ore. 2009). The court dismissed this request for pre-enforcement re-
view, concluding that the action presented no case or controversy that was ripe for adjudication. See
Assoc. Ore. Indus. v. Avakian, 2010 WL 1838661 (D. Or. May 6, 2010).
278 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-9 to 32:19-14 (West 2009).
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including reinstatement, lost wages, and attorney fees. 2 79 The New Jersey
legislation is narrower than that passed by Oregon, however. While the
New Jersey Act, like Oregon's, bars mandatory attendance at workplace
captive audience meetings "the purpose of which is to communicate the
employer's opinion about . . . political matters," the New Jersey statute ex-
cludes from the definition of "political matters" meetings to discuss the me-
rits of union representation.2 80
Numerous other state legislatures are weighing enactment of variations
of the intentional tort created by the model Worker Freedom Act. The Col-
orado legislature approved the act in 2006 but it was vetoed by the gover-
nor.2 8 1 The West Virginia House of Delegates approved such an act in Feb-
ruary 2008 but the legislature failed to enact it.2 82  Meanwhile, legislative
chambers in New Hampshire, Michigan, and Vermont also have approved
bills modeled after the Worker Freedom Act.283 In addition, similar legisla-
tion has been introduced in the Connecticut and Missouri legislatures.2 84
4. Objections to the Worker Freedom Act
Three categories of objection have been raised to these Worker Free-
dom Act bills. The first is non-legal. Employers have argued that the
Worker Freedom Act violates the employer's managerial prerogative.28 5
Second, employer representatives have argued that the Worker Free-
dom Act infringes on the employer's free speech rights.286 However, as
shown above, a ban on captive audience meetings for the purposes of politi-
cal and religious indoctrination does not violate employer rights because
279 
d.
280 See Secunda, supra note 143, at 228-29.




284 See Stephen Singer, Conn. Considers Bill to Prevent Proselytism in the Workplace, AP, Mar. 11,
2006, available at http://www.christianpost.com/article/20060311/conn-considers-bill-to-prevent-
proselytism-in-the-workplace/index.html (last visited July 7, 2009) (discussing the Connecticut bill);
H.R. 1371, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006), available at
http://www.house.mo.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills06l/biltxt/intro/HBl3711.htm.
285 Opposed to the Oregon Worker Freedom Act, the Vice President of Associated Oregon Industries is
reported to have questioned what is wrong with making employees attend meetings: "Employees work
at the pleasure of the employer and the employer is entitled to make a request or demands on the em-
ployee's time if the employer pays for it." Janie Har, Oregon House Sides with Labor on Workplace
Communications, THE OREGONIAN, June 19, 2009, available at
http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2009/06/oregonjhouse_sideswithlabor.html. This Arti-
cle has demonstrated that "what's wrong with making workers attend meetings?" is that such coercion
trammels fundamental liberties enshrined in the Constitution, liberties that states have the prerogative to
protect legislatively from private infringement. Id.
286 See Peter Wong, Bill That Was High Priority for Labor Unions Passes, STATESMAN JOURNAL, June
20, 2009, at C3 (stating that "[blusiness groups argue[] that the bill violates their right to communicate
with employees.. . .").
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coerced listening itself violates a constitutionally recognized freedom. State
legislatures are entitled to protect employees' constitutional rights by creat-
ing a statutory tort to protect against private infringement thereof. Simply
put, the employer has no constitutional right to coerce listening among its
employees.287
A final objection is that the Worker Freedom Act conflicts with, and
therefore is preempted by, the NLRA to the extent that it bans workplace
captive audience meetings discussing the merits of union representation.288
A brief overview of labor preemption is offered here to provide a founda-
tion for explaining why the Worker Freedom Act, adopted to protect work-
ers' constitutional freedom not to listen, is not preempted by federal law.
Most labor preemption is either conflict or frustration (obstacle) pre-
emption; thus, the Act normally does not preempt state law "unless it con-
flicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme . . . .289 Ex-
cept when state action expressly contravenes a federal right or prohibition,
the Court is required to determine whether Congress, had it considered the
matter, would have intended preemption because the state law frustrates
federal labor policy. 2 90 Garmon preemption guards against such frustration
created when state law undermines federally protected rights or the integrity
of the NLRB's primary jurisdiction.29 1 With certain exceptions, it preempts
state and local law that regulates conduct actually or even arguably pro-
tected by section 7 of the Act or prohibited by section 8. Machinists pre-
287 See discussion supra notes 134-195 and accompanying text.
288 Professor Paul Secunda and Kye D. Pawlenko have published conflicting views on this question.
Compare Secunda, supra note 143, at 229-39 (arguing no pre-emption) with Kye D. Pawlenko, The
Non- Viability of State Regulation of Workplace Captive Audience Meetings: A Response to Professor
Secunda, 32 HAMLINE L. REv. 191 (2009) (arguing there is pre-emption). I need not address their de-
bate in detail here because, as I show next, the Worker Freedom Act is protected from preemption for
reasons not addressed in their exchange of views. The Secunda/Pawlenko exchange quite adequately
outlines the basic rules of labor preemption. I previously have laid out those basics, see Roger C. Hart-
ley, Preemption's Market Participant Immunity-A Constitutional Interpretation: Implications for Liv-
ing Wage and Labor Peace Policies, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 230-32 (2003), as have many oth-
ers, see, e.g., Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth
Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 469, n.508 (1993);
Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7
YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990); Eileen Silverstein, Against Labor Preemption, 24 CONN. L. REv. 1, 2 n.8
(1991) (collecting authority); id. at 4-6.
289 Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 747-48 (1985) (citations omitted). Rarely, "courts discern
from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the
States" and preclude all state regulation in that area, but that is not implicated in the present discussion.
Id. Section 301 preemption is an example of this. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
220-21 (1985).
290 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 623 (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (discussing how labor preemption developed from "a series of implications regarding con-
gressional intent in the face of congressional silence").
291 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
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emption 2 92 guards against a different type of frustration of national labor
policy-that caused by state law interfering with the congressional judg-
ment that certain conduct should be left unregulated by any governmental
body.293 It prohibits state and municipal regulation that the courts conclude
"upset[s] the balance of power between labor and management expressed in
our national labor policy."2 94
Banning workplace captive audience meetings that attempt to inculcate
the employer's religious or political ideology through coerced listening is
preempted neither by Garmon nor Machinists.
a. Garmon Preemption
Garmon does not bar states from banning workplace captive audience
meetings because such legislation does not threaten the NLRB's primary
jurisdiction, which is the bedrock concern of Garmon preemption.2 95 In
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters the Court
explained that Garmon preemption requires proof of a "realistic risk of
[state] interference with the Labor Board's primary jurisdiction." 29 6 There
is no such "realistic risk" unless the controversy in the state court is "identi-
cal" to the controversy that would be before the NLRB if the matter had
been brought to the NLRB.2 97 In Sears, a trespass action was brought in
state court arising out of conduct by a union that may or may not have vio-
lated section 8 of the Act, depending on the object of the picketing.298 The
Court ruled there was no Garmon preemption because the focus of the tres-
pass action was the location of the picketing and the focus of litigation be-
292 Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140
(1976).
293 Id. at 146
294 Id.
295 Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 748 (1985) ("The so called Garmon [preemption] protects
the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB to determine in the first instance what kind of conduct is either
prohibited or protected by the NLRA") (citations omitted). The Secunda/Pawlenko debate consumed
much space disagreeing over whether the Garmon reference to preempting state regulation touching
matters "protected by the NLRA" meant only activity protected by section 7 of the Act (a section which
protects only employee rights but not employer rights) as asserted in the Secunda article, see Secunda,
supra note 143, at 232-34, or whether it also means that state regulation may be preempted under Gar-
mon if it regulates any conduct "subject to the Board's regulatory jurisdiction" as asserted in the Paw-
lenko article. See Pawlenko, supra note 288, at 195-98. For purposes of my analysis, I assume for sake
of argument that Pawlenko is correct that Gannon is designed to protect NLRB primary jurisdiction to
interpret all sections of the Act, not just sections 7 and 8.
296 436 U.S. 180, 198 (1978).
297 Id. at 197 ("The critical inquiry ... is not whether the State is enforcing a law relating specifically to
labor relations or one of general application but whether the controversy presented to the state court is
identical to . . . or different from . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor
Board. For it is only in the former situation that a state court's exercise of jurisdiction necessarily in-
volves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board which the arguably
prohibited branch of the Garmon doctrine was designed to avoid.").
298 Id. at 185.
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fore the NLRB would have been the object of the picketing.299 Given this
differing focus, the controversies were not the same and, therefore, the state
court adjudication of the trespass would not threaten the NLRB's primary
jurisdiction. 3 00
Subsequently, in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,o' the Court applied the same
principle. There, striker replacements brought a breach of contract and mis-
representation claim against an employer based on the employer's promise
of permanent employment status following the termination of a strike.302
The employer's promise was arguably a violation of the Act, depending on
whether the strikers were economic or unfair labor practice strikers.303 The
Court held there was no Garmon preemption of the state claims because the
controversies in state court and those that might have been brought before
the NLRB were different since they raised "discrete concerns."3 04 The fo-
cus of the state and NLRB proceedings would be on the interests of differ-
ent groups of persons.30 5 In addition, each forum would focus on different
legal issues and remedies.30 6
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, Local 25307
is an additional example of the same principle, that there is no Garmon pre-
emption unless the controversies before the state court and the NLRB suffi-
ciently overlap, for only then is the NLRB's primary jurisdiction jeopard-
ized. In Farmer, the Court held that a state court action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising out of a union's alleged discrimina-
tory job referrals was not Garmon preempted even though the basis for the
claim arose out of a labor relations controversy and "might form the basis
for unfair labor practice charges before the Board."30 8 The Court empha-
sized the importance of avoiding an "inflexible application of the [Garmon]
doctrine especially where the State has a substantial interest in regulation of
the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not threaten un-
due interference with the federal regulatory scheme." 30 9 The Court stressed
299 Id at 198.
300 Id. at 202-03.
301 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
302 Id. at 493-95.
303 Id. at 500-01, 503, 507-08; see also id. at 527-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
304 Id. at 512 ("The interests of the Board and the NLRA, on the one hand, and the interest of the state in
providing a remedy to its citizens for breach of contract, on the other, are "discrete" concerns . . . . We
see no basis for holding that permitting the contract cause of action will conflict with the rights of either
the strikers or the employer or would frustrate any policy of the federal labor laws.").
305 At the state court the focus would be on the rights of the replacements, whereas before the NLRB,
the focus of the section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) litigation would be on the rights of the strikers. Id. at 510-11.
306 At the state court, the question would be whether the company made misrepresentations and/or
whether the contract was breached. Id. at 511. At the NLRB, the question would be whether the strike
was an unfair labor practice strike. Id. at 511.
307 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
308 Id. at 302.
309 Id.
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the importance of comparing the focus of the state litigation with the focus
of the litigation that would be before the Board if a charge had been filed
with the Board. In Farmer that focus was entirely different because litiga-
tion before the NLRB would concentrate on interference with rights pro-
tected by section 7 in the context of the employment relationship but
"[w]hether the statements or conduct of the respondents also caused [the
union member] severe emotional distress and physical injury would play no
role in the Board disposition of the case, and the Board could not award
[him] damages for pain, suffering, or medical expenses."31 o
The principle in all of these cases was concisely explained by the Court
in Belknap. The key inquiry, the Court explained, when evaluating whether
the Board's primary jurisdiction is jeopardized by state regulations is
whether it appears that the state-court plaintiff is seeking to ignore the
NLRB, that is, whether the plaintiff is attempting to use the state court as an
"alternative forum" to avoid reliance on the NLRB for the relief sought.
Enforcing the Worker Freedom Act in state court does not jeopardize
the NLRB's primary jurisdiction because an employee does not bring an ac-
tion in state court to protect his constitutional liberty not to listen instead of
bringing an action before the NLRB. It is not the function of the NLRB to
protect individual constitutional rights.3 12 Indeed, under current law, if an
individual on his own and for his own benefit sought protection against
forced workplace listening, the NLRB could not provide a remedy because
the NLRA only protects "concerted" activity for mutual aid or protection,
not the rights of individual, qua individuals.313 Moreover, the focus of a
claim challenging a captive audience meeting before the NLRB would be
an inquiry into whether employer conduct caused interference with em-
ployee free choice in choosing or rejecting union representation. Indeed,
that was exactly the focus in Clark Brothers, the Board's last effort to ban
workplace captive audience meetings. By contrast, the focus of the
Worker Freedom Act claim in state court is the mandatory nature of captive
audience meetings-the invasion of the liberty interest in not being forced
to listen. In short, the focus of litigation before the NLRB is interference
with employee free choice regarding unionization, while in litigation under
310 Id. at 304.
311 Belknap, 463 U.S. at 510 (holding that there is no threat to the Board's primary jurisdiction because
"[tihe state courts in no way offer [plaintiffs] an alternative forum for obtaining relief that the Board can
provide").
312 "The NLRA does not provide, of course, a comprehensive scheme for the vindication of the plain-
tiffs' constitutional rights." Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 2001).
313 See, e.g., Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885 (1986) (Meyers II) ("[I]n general, to find an em-
ployee's activity to be 'concerted,' we shall require that it be engaged in with or on the authority of other
employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.") (quoting Meyers Indus., 268
N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (Meyers 1)).
314 See discussion supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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the Worker Freedom Act the effect of the captive audience meeting on free-
dom to choose or reject a union is immaterial.
Moreover, as in Farmer, there is no Garmon preemption of the Worker
Freedom Act because "the State has a substantial interest in regulation of
the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not threaten un-
due interference with the federal regulatory scheme."315 As has been dem-
onstrated above, the state has a deeply-rooted interest in protecting constitu-
tional rights from abridgement by private parties.316 Moreover, state court
actions enforcing a ban on all religious or political workplace captive audi-
ence meetings do not "threaten undue interference with the federal regula-
tory scheme" for the efficacy of the regulatory scheme administered by the
NLRB does not depend on the continuing presence of employer captive au-
dience meetings. Neither Congress nor the NLRB has ever made a deter-
mination that these meetings are integral to providing the freedom of choice
upon which the statute is based. Indeed, for a time the Board held that
workplace captive audience meetings were per se unlawful.317 It is impor-
tant to remember that the Board withdrew its proscription of workplace cap-
tive audience meetings in 1948 not because they were needed to provide
employees free choice but rather based on a mistaken view that employer
free speech rights precluded their proscription. 318 Moreover, neither Con-
gress nor the NLRB has made a determination that captive audience meet-
ings are essential (or even beneficial) to effectuation of the NLRA. The
most one can say with any certainty is that for roughly half a century the
NLRB has been agnostic regarding the contribution to free and open debate
resulting from coerced listening imposed by employers. Therefore, regula-
tion of captive audience meetings by the states does not interfere with the
NLRB's primary jurisdiction. In Livingston Shirt Corp.3 19 the Board reiter-
ated that captive audience meetings are left unregulated by the NLRB due
to an absence of evidence that Congress intended to ban them. Banning the
captive audience meeting, the NLRB concluded, would require "administra-
tively grafting new limbs on the statute" since the Board could "find noth-
ing in the statute which even hints at any congressional intent to restrict an
employer in the use of his own premises for the purpose of airing his
views." 32 0 This view, of course, falsely equates the absence of an explicit
congressional intent to proscribe to a congressional intent to preserve.321
315 Farmer, 430 U.S. at 302.
316 See discussion supra notes 243-261 and accompanying text.
317 See discussion supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
318 See discussion supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
319 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953).
320 Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
321 Nor does the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Amendments require the conclusion that state
bans of workplace captive audience meetings "threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory
scheme." Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977). As
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Moreover, Garmon does not preempt the Worker Freedom Act because
it is well-established that states are empowered to regulate when "the regu-
lated conduct touche[s] interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and re-
sponsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [the
Court] could not infer that Congress had deprived the States" of regulatory
authority. 322 Primarily, intentional torts-often involving civil unrest-fall
into this "overriding local interest" exception.32 3 But, the Court has ac-
knowledged other intentional torts as qualifying, such as malicious defama-
tion324 and intentional infliction of emotional distress.32 5
This exception has been applied also to torts unrelated to civil unrest.
For example, in Radcliffe v. Rainbow Construction Co. 32 6 a union represen-
tative who was exercising a right under state law to visit a construction site
filed a claim against an employer for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution following his arrest for trespassing.327 The court held
that these claims were not preempted under Garmon even though the em-
ployer's actions in securing the arrest were arguably violative of the Act. 32 8
Applying the principles discussed above, the court held that there was a
lack of identity between the state claims and any unfair labor practice litiga-
tion that might have been brought.32 9 Moreover, the "[fjreedom of citizens
from false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution 'touches
interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the ab-
sence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Con-
gress had deprived the States of power to act."'
3 30
As has been demonstrated above, the intentional tort created by the
Worker Freedom Act also is deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibil-
ity331 and for that additional reason is not preempted.
shown above, at most there is a fragment of suggestion in one line of a Senate Report that the NLRB
should not ban captive audience meetings but then only because of perceived employer free speech
rights to hold them. See discussion supra notes 219-238 and accompanying text. That fragment is a far
cry from a congressional mandate. In any event, the premise that employers have a constitutionally-
protected free speech right to coerce listening has not survived the test of time. See discussion supra
notes 62-195 and accompanying text.
322 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
323 See, e.g., Int'l Union, United Auto. Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (threats); Youngdal v.
Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (obstruction of streets and threats); Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (violence).
324 See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966).
325 See Farmer, 430 U.S. 290.
326 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001).
327 Id. at 776-77.
328 Id. at 784-87.
329 Id. at 786-88.
330 Id. at 785 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44).
331 See discussion supra notes 239-284 and accompanying text.'
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b. Machinists Preemption
Machinists preemption enforces the congressional judgment that cer-
tain conduct should remain unregulated and instead be "controlled by the
free play of economic forces."332 The Court's most recent articulation of
the Machinists preemption doctrine is Chamber of Commerce v. Brown.333
As the Court there explained, "Machinists pre-emption is based on the pre-
mise that Congress struck a balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez-
faire in respect to union organization, collective bargaining, and labor dis-
putes." 33 4 In Brown, the Court found Machinists preempted a California
statute that precluded the recipients of state funds from using those funds
"for the purpose of influencing employees to support or oppose unioniza-
tion and to prohibit an employer from seeking to influence employees to
support or oppose unionization while those employees are performing work
on a state contract." 335 The Court found that California had made the judg-
ment that "partisan employer speech necessarily interferes with an em-
ployee's choice about whether to join or to be represented by a labor un-
ion. ,336 Since this was exactly the opposite judgment Congress made in
section 8(c) of the Act-that non-coercive employer speech has a legitimate
role in union representation decisions-the California statute was found
"unequivocally pre-empted" as it conflicted with the "explicit direction
from Congress to leave noncoercive speech unregulated."33 7
As interpreted in Brown, Machinists would not preempt the Worker
Freedom Act. Brown protects the integrity of the congressional judgment
that the content of employer speech shall remain unregulated as long as it
remains non-coercive. The Worker Freedom Act, by contrast, is not based
on any presupposition about the inherent coerciveness (or non-
coerciveness) of the content of employer workplace speech. Its enactment
and administration are wholly unconcerned with taking sides regarding that
controversy. The sole focus of the Worker Freedom Act is the coercive
manner of the presentation of workplace speech, not its content, for it bans
employer speech only when it is coerced and forced upon employees at the
workplace. In passing the Worker Freedom Act, the state legislature makes
a judgment that coerced listening violates employee civil liberties guaran-
teed by the Constitution. Nothing in the legislative history of the NLRA
precludes state action to protect such liberties, and thus the decision in
332 See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140
(1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
333 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
Id. at 2412 (quoting Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140) (internal quotation marks omitted).
335Id. at 2411.
336 Id. at 2414.
33 7 d.
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Brown provides no basis for concluding that the Worker Freedom Act is
Machinist preempted.
Once it is understood that state regulation of workplace captive audi-
ence meetings through the Worker Freedom Act is fully consistent with
Congress's decision that the non-coercive content of employer workplace
speech should remain unregulated, there is no basis for finding Machinists
preemption. First, we do not expect Congress to enact legislation intended
to deny the states their traditional role of protecting constitutional freedoms
from private infringement or relegating the enjoyment of these freedoms to
the "free play of economic forces." Certainly one would not expect such
an intent to be manifested through congressional silence.
Second, finding Machinists preemption of state efforts to ban coerced
workplace listening is at odds with the Act's commitment to ensuring that
unionization decisions should be a product of a "free debate on issues divid-
ing labor and management." 339 When a state bans workplace captive audi-
ence meetings, it protects captive workers' freedom of the mind, which in
turn promotes free choice, which is the goal of the Act. The Act leaves no
room for any party to attempt to use superior economic power to manipu-
late the outcome of unionization decisions.3 40
Finally, there are no grounds to conclude that Congress intended that
the captive audience meeting should remain immune from all governmental
regulation and subject only to the "free play of economic forces" and the
"balance of power between labor and management." 341 In Belknap, Inc. v.
Hale the Court explained the conduct it was referring to in Machinists as
"conduct that was to remain a part of the self-help remedies left to the com-
batants in labor disputes." 3 4 2 But such "self-help," which arises in conflicts
between an employer and its employees, is illusory prior to unionization.
Prior to choosing union representation employees remain atomized because
collective cohesion is still forming and the employer's superior economic
power over them remains intact.343 Nor is there any "free play" of eco-
nomic power when individual employees attempt to contest employer au-
thority in a labor relations system built upon the doctrine of employment at
will. When "listen or leave" is the workplace rule and employees lack un-
ion representation, employees have no realistic alternative but to succumb
3 See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140
(1976).
339 Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2413 (quoting Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
340 See discussion supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
341 Machinists, 427 U.S. at 146.
342 463 U.S. 491, 499 (1983).
343 See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (referring to the "[t]he inequality of
bargaining power between employers and employees who do not possess the full freedom of association
or actual liberty of contract [when dealing with] employers who are organized in the corporate . . .
form[] of ownership").
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to employer coercion and it is unrealistic to suppose that through the "self-
help" Machinists anticipates employees could protect their freedom not to
listen. Congress certainly was aware of the reality of the "inequality of bar-
gaining power between employees who do not possess . . . actual freedom
of contract and employers . ... There is no evidence that Congress in-
tended to deny states their traditional role of protecting employees' consti-
tutional rights from private infringement-here the freedom not to listen.
V.
CONCLUSION
A colleague who is not a labor lawyer kindly reviewed this Article
prior to publication. When he finished, he remarked, "How employers sold
[the right to hold captive audience meetings] as a First Amendment right is
a mystery to me . . . ." My colleague's comment suggests that labor law
practitioners and academics can all too easily become acculturated to the
rules with which we have come to feel comfortable, if for no better reason
than their longevity. Interpreting the NLRA as permitting the mandatory
workplace captive audience meeting is a good example. Perhaps the larger
lesson here is the need for examination of other "established" rules and pro-
cedures that similarly have become embedded and accepted over the years.
Such a review and "second look" (and revision) is no substitute for con-
gressional labor law reform, but it may produce immediate modest reforms
that will make the Act an even better vehicle for effectuating employee free
choice and free association.
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